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THE INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION
OF COMPETITION NORMS AND BRAZILIAN
COMPETITION LAw: THE USE OF
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
Kathryn McMahon*
UNLIKE many other emerging and developing countries where
competition laws have only recently been enacted, Brazil has
had a long history of the application of competition laws and
policies, culminating in its most recent legislative reforms in 2011. Brazil-
ian competition agencies are also internationally commended as a success
story, particularly for their strong stance against, and criminalization of,
cartel activity. But there are also emerging difficulties. In recent years,
the Brazilian constitutional courts have become important sites of social
change as they adjudicate in areas such as health, telecommunications,
and financial markets. There have been comparatively fewer applications
for judicial review in competition law, however, and those who have liti-
gated have been subject to increased costs and lengthy court delays.
Rather, Brazilian competition law is increasingly characterized by a shift
to the extra-judicial resolution of disputes. This decline in judicial review
has had important consequences on the supervisory design and effective-
ness of regulatory institutions and the identification of substantive con-
duct, potentially opening the way to inconsistent and discretionary
regulatory interventions.
Many of the recent reforms to Brazilian competition law and regula-
tory institutions can be linked to similar approaches in other jurisdictions
and follow closely the ideal of the "regulatory state" and recommenda-
tions made in "peer reviews" of Brazilian competition law by interna-
tional antitrust experts and agencies such as the ICN and OECD. The
first part of this article will examine the transfer and impact of these har-
monized regimes and "soft laws" in emerging and developing countries.
The second part will trace these issues in a particular policy area: the shift
in Brazilian competition law from judicial review to the increasing "set-
tlement" of competition disputes, particularly for cartels. It will evaluate
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how the local institutional context acts to constrain and modify (with im-
plications for its effectiveness) an imported, harmonized regime.
I. INTRODUCTION
Brazil is a BRICS economy with the ninth largest GDP in the world.,
Unlike many other emerging and developing countries where competi-
tion laws have only recently been enacted, Brazil has had a much longer
history of the application of antitrust laws and policies, culminating in its
most recent legislative reforms in 2011.2 Brazilian competition agencies
are also internationally commended as a success story, particularly for
their strong stance against, and criminalization of, cartel activity.3 But,
Brazil also experiences difficulties with lengthy court delays and under-
resourced enforcement agencies.4
The story of Brazilian competition law is also inextricably linked to its
unique political history transitioning from military dictatorship and state
ownership to a more market-oriented economy with the enactment of the
1988 Constitution, which laid an explicit constitutional foundation for
competition law incorporating an "economic order" with due regard for
"free competition." 5
In recent years, the Brazilian constitutional courts have become impor-
tant sites of social change as they adjudicate in areas such as health, tele-
communications, and financial markets.6 This growth of judicial review
has shifted the balance towards the interests of individual rights over
those of health care providers and financial institutions, and has had a
vital supervisory impact on the procedural design and effectiveness of
regulatory institutions.7 Notwithstanding the constitutional foundation
for competition law, there have been comparatively fewer applications
1. In 2015, Brazil's GDP was $1.775 Trillion. Information About Brics, BRICS MINIS-
TRY OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS, http://brics.itamaraty.gov.br/about-brics/informa-
tion-about-brics (last visited Mar. 5, 2017); Gross Domestic Product 2015, WORLD
BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table (last updated
Feb. 1, 2017).
2. Francisco Ribeiro Todorov, Marcelo Maciel & Torres Filho, History of Competi-
tion Policy in Brazil: 1930-2010 57 ANTITRUST BULL. 207, 243 (2012).
3. Id. at 246.
4. Id.
5. Constituigio Federal [C.F.][Constitution] art. 170, 173 (Braz); see Todorov,
Marciel & Filho, supra note 2, at 219, 230.
6. See generally Octavio Ferraz, Between Activism and Deference: Social rights adjudi-
cation in the Brazilian Supreme Federal Tribunal, in SOCIAL & ECONOMIC RIGHTS
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (Helena Alviar Garcia, Lucy
Williams & Karl Klare eds., 2015); Octavio Ferraz, The right to health in the courts
of Brazil: Worsening health inequalities?, 11 HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS J. 33
(2013); Viviane Muller Prado, The Judicial Interference on the Regulation of the
Brazilian Capital Market: The Case of Executive Remuneration and Transparency
(Dec. 2013), available at https://www.academia.edu/6567797/TheJudicialInterfer
enceintheRegulation of theBrazilian-CapitalMarketTheCaseofExecu
tiveRemunerationandTransparency.
7. Viviane Muller Prado, The Judicial Interference on the Regulation of the Brazilian
Capital Market: The Case of Executive Remuneration and Transparency (Dec.
2013), available at https://www.academia.edu/6567797/TheJudicialInterference
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for judicial review and private damages in this area, and those who have
litigated have been subject to increased costs and lengthy court delays.8
Brazilian competition law is increasingly characterized by a shift to the
extra-judicial resolution of disputes where settlement (and leniency for
cartels) agreements are concluded at an early stage of the investigation
process. 9 This decline in judicial supervision has had important conse-
quences on the identification of the boundaries of substantive conduct
provisions and legal certainty, potentially opening the way to inconsistent
and discretionary regulatory interventions.
Many of the recent reforms to Brazilian competition law and regula-
tory institutions can be linked to similar approaches in other jurisdictions.
They also follow views of the "regulatory state" and recommendations
made in "peer reviews" of Brazilian competition regulation by interna-
tional antitrust experts and agencies such as the International Competi-
tion Network (ICN) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD).10 The first part of this article will examine the
transfer and impact of these harmonized regimes and "soft laws" in
emerging and developing countries in the context of divergent institu-
tional, cultural, and economic circumstances. The 2016 signing of a Mem-
orandum of Understanding (MoU) between Brazil and other BRICS
countries, for the creation of an Institutional Partnership for multilateral
cooperation and exchange of information on competition law issues, is
both a recognition of these trends and an effort to propose alternative
voices and solutions for the institutional and economic challenges faced
by the BRICS jurisdictions."
The next part of this article will trace such concerns in a particular pol-
icy area: the shift in Brazilian competition law from judicial review to the
increasing use of extra-judicial "settlement" of competition disputes. It
will demonstrate how the local institutional context acts to constrain and
modify the importation (and perhaps effectiveness) of a harmonized set-
tlement regime, particularly for cartels.
II. THE HISTORY OF BRAZILIAN COMPETITION LAW
More than 120 countries now have some form of competition legisla-
in theRegulationof the_Brazilian-CapitalMarketTheCaseofExecutive_
RemunerationandTransparency.
8. Luciana L. Yeung and Paulo F. Azevedo, 'Measuring efficiency of Brazilian courts
with data envelopment analysis (DEA)' 22 IMA Journal of Management Mathe-
matics 343-356 (2011); Paulo Furquim de Azevedo, 'What's the Role of Judicial
Review in Latin American Countries,' 7 (1) CPI Antitrust Chronicle 2-7 (2014).
9. Todorov, Marciel & Filho, supra note 2, at 233 n.79.
10. See id. at 241.
11. See loannis Lianos, Global Governance of Antitrust and the Need for a BRICS
Joint Research Platform in Competition Law and Policy (Centre for Law, Econ.
and Society, Research Paper Series: 5/2016).
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tion.12 Many of these regimes have only recently been enacted in devel-
oping and emerging economies.13 Competition regimes and the concept
of "competition as the regulator" were seen as key technocratic tools in
the arsenal of the "regulatory state" in the 1990s as the processes of liber-
alization and privatization were being incorporated under the Washing-
ton Consensus. 1 4 As part of this initiative, competition laws were
implemented to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and to ensure
that trade liberalization and the removal of price controls were not un-
dermined by the creation of artificial barriers to entry, cartels, and pro-
tectionist policies.' 5 While international development theory may have
moved on from the purely neo-liberal market-oriented reforms emblem-
atic of the Washington Consensus,16 strong competition laws are still seen
as an essential arbiter of neo-liberal market reforms and privatized for-
mer government monopolies.1 7
Unlike many of these recent enactments in other jurisdictions, compe-
tition policies and laws have been present in Brazil for a much longer
period. 8 These include early attempts to introduce competition policy
during the process of industrialization in the 1930s and the enactment of
legislation in 1962.19 The 1962 Act created the regulatory body, CADE
(Administrative Council for Economic Defense, Conselho Administra-
tivo de Defesa Econdmica), but the legislation was largely unenforced
under the military government (1964-1985), which favored a more in-
terventionist industrial policy focusing on public ownership, price control,
and subsidies.2 0 The enactment of the 1988 Constitution signaled a shift
towards more market-oriented policies.21
However, competition law enforcement in Brazil was not really effec-
12. Fiona M. Scott Morton, How Do You Enforce Antitrust Law in a Global Market-
place?, YALE INSIGHTS (June 16, 2016), http://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/how-
do-you-enforce-antitrust-law-in-global-marketplace.
13. As many as 75 percent of countries with a competition regime are emerging or
developing countries. Eleanor Fox, Economic Development, Poverty, and Anti-
trust: The Other Path, 13 Sw. J. oF LAW AND TRADE IN THE AMERICAS, 101, 104
(2013); Taimon Stewart, Julian Clarke & Susan Joekes, Competition Law in Ac-
tion: Experiences from Developing Countries, 4 (2007).
14. John Williamson, The Progress of Policy Reform in Latin America (Institute for
International Economics, 1990).
15. Eleanor Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down, and Sideways,
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1781, 1788-89 (2000); Frank Emmert, Franz Kronthaler & Jo-
hannes Florian Stephan, Analysis of Statements Made in Favour of and Against the
Adoption of Competition Law in Developing and Transition Economies, at 30
(Halle Institute for Economic Research 2005/1, June 2005).
16. The value of these market reforms was also questioned when the promised out-
comes of the Washington Consensus and import replacement programs did not
materialize. See David Kennedy, The "Rule of Law," Political Choices and Devel-
opment Common Sense, in THE NEw LAW AND EcoNoMic DEVELOPMENT: A
CRITICAL APPRAISAL (David M Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
17. See id. at 141.
18. See Todorov, Marciel & Filho, supra note 2.
19. Id. at 208.
20. Id. at 217.
21. Id. at 225.
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tive until the 1994 statute. 22 At that time the "Brazilian Competition Au-
thorities" were comprised of the Secretariat for Economic Monitoring
(SEAE), a unit within the Ministry of Finance, and the National Secreta-
riat of Economic Law (SDE) (Secretaria Nacional de Direito Econdm-
ico), a unit responsible for investigation and CADE, which was given
independent regulatory status from the executive and was empowered to
determine final enforcement decisions.2 3 Competition law received
prominence during the movement from a highly concentrated and con-
trolled economy to the implementation of more market-oriented reforms.
While competition law regimes in many emerging economies may still
struggle to achieve enforcement goals, the Brazilian regime has largely
been considered a success. 24 Cartel conduct has been criminalized in
Brazil since 1990 and leniency provisions, which encourage cartel partici-
pants to confess their involvement in return for immunity or a reduction
in fines were also implemented in 2000.25 Powers to conduct "dawn
raids" were also introduced to bolster investigation processes and un-
cover evidence. 26 While these measures considerably enhanced the suc-
cess of enforcement, as well as impositing of some large fines particularly
for cartel conduct, 27 institutional problems remained. CADE was under-
resourced and faced problems of overlapping jurisdiction and the inabil-
ity to initiate independent investigations. 2 8
III. REFORM OF BRAZILIAN COMPETITION LAW IN 2011
The reforms introduced in 2011 addressed many of these procedural
difficulties and overlapping competencies in the former legislation. 29
They included the requirement for pre-merger notification, which deals
with problems arising from post-merger decisions where the agreement
had to be unraveled, resulting in a lengthy appeals process. 30 The new
legislation also created longer term appointments for commissioners, im-
proving independence and autonomy, considerably streamlining the divi-
sion of work among the competition agencies, and removing the former
complicated regulatory system involving the three regulatory institutions
where CADE could only proceed to enforcement once an investigation
had been concluded by SDE.3 1 SDE no longer exists as a separate entity
22. Id. at 234.
23. Id. at 234, 243 n.105.
24. Id. at 243.
25. Id. at 238. The law came into force on December 21, 2000.
26. Id.
27. See generally Ana Paula Martinez, Challenges Ahead of Leniency Programmes:
The Brazilian Experience 6 J. OF EUROPEAN COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 1 (2015).
28. See Todorov, Marciel & Filho, supra note 2, at 243.
29. Id. at 243-244. The law entered into force on May 29, 2012; see also Martinez,
supra note 27.
30. See Todorov, Marciel & Filho, supra note 2, at 244.
31. Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev. [OECD], Note by Brazil, Roundtable on
changes in Institutional Design of Competition Authorities, at 3 DAF/COMP/
WD(2014)129, http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/
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and its antitrust functions have been transferred to CADE, which is now
made up of the investigative branch of the General Superintendence, the
Administrative Tribunal and Department of Economic Studies.32 SEAE
remains responsible for advocacy and promoting competition policies to
government agencies. 33
IV. COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT
In spite of these recent reforms, competition law enforcement in Brazil
faces many obstacles. The competition agencies are still under-resourced
with respect to the size of the economy, as well as lengthy court delays for
judicial review. While the Brazilian economy has undertaken a process of
more openness to external competition and privatization since 1994, it
still remains highly concentrated with a significant level of government
ownership and a historical policy of nationalistic pro-development
(desenvolvimentismo), which downplayed market forces and promoted
state intervention, industrialization, and import substitution.34
The 2008 global financial crisis also lent political support to more pro-
tectionist policies. More recently, Brazil has struggled with political in-
stability, a corruption crisis, and large public debt, leading to the
contraction of its GDP. Brazil also faces concerns in common with all
emerging economies that grapple with the priority that should be given to
competition law when there are limited resources and other conflicting
demands, such as the right to an adequate standard of living, including
health and housing.35 Competition law, in fostering the free market and
preserving existing power relationships, is seen to have little effect on
issues and inequalities. 36 On the other hand, under-enforcement of com-
?cote=DAF/COMP/WD(2014)129&doclanguage=en [hereinafter Roundtable on
changes].
32. Todorov, Marciel & Filho, supra note 2, at 243-244.
33. See generally Roundtable on changes, supra note 31, at 3; Org. for Econ. Coopera-
tion and Dev. (OECD), Annual Report on Competition Policy Developments in
Brazil - 2014, 8-9, DAF/COMP/AR(2015)19 (May 19, 2015), available at http://
www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/
AR(2015)19&docLanguage=en [hereinafter Annual Report]; Alexandre Wagner
Nester, Brazilian Antitrust Law, in BRAZIL INFRASTRUcTURE LAW (Marqal Justen
Filho, Cesar Pereira & Maria Augusta Rost eds., 2016).
34. See Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev. (OECD), OECD Global Forum on
Competition: Contribution from Brazil, 18, CCNM/GF/COMP/WD(2002)3 (Jan.
29, 2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocu
mentpdf/?cote=CCNM/GFCOMP/WD(2002)3&docLanguage=en [hereinafter
OECD Global Forum]; Paulo-Tarso Flecha De Lima, Liberalism versus National-
ism: the Prodevelopment Ideology in Recent Brazilian Political History (1930-
1997), 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 370, 386 (1999); Todorov, Marciel & Filho, supra
note 2, at 219-220.
35. See Fox supra note 13, at 111; see generally Jens Arnold & Joao Jalles, Dividing the
Pie in Brazil: Income Distribution, Social Policies and the New Middle Class, at 16
(OECD Econ. Dept. Working Papers, No. 1105, 2014)
36. See id. at 108; see also HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND CON-
SUMER WELFARE IN ANTITRUST, UNIv. OF IOWA WORKING PAPER 1, 17 (2011);
Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequal-
ity, 104 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1, 14 (2015).
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petition law is problematic in developing and emerging economies be-
cause international trade and globalization is disproportionate to the
detrimental impact of international cartels and the abuse dominance by
foreign firms.37 Domestic and international cartels, which have raised the
price of many staple commodities, can have a real impact on consumer
purchasing power and, thereby, the poverty levels of developing and
emerging economies.3 8 Competition can also promote social mobility by
removing barriers to entry, strengthening equality of bargaining power
and fostering the new entry of small enterprises. Strong enforcement of
competition law has also been linked to increased economic growth.3 9
Such enforcement can also have a political dimension because a state
dominated by a few concentrated interests and wealth transfers can be
considered antidemocratic. 4 0 In Brazil, the enforcement of competition
law can also have a direct impact on equality and welfare policies because
pecuniary penalties are paid into the Fund for Defense of Diffuse Rights
(Fundo de Defesa de Direitos Difusos) (FDD), which supports projects
on the environment; free competition; consumer rights; and historical,
cultural and artistic heritage.41
37. Julian L. Clarke & Simon J. Evenett, The Deterrent Effects of National Anti-Cartel
Laws: Evidence from the International Vitamins Cartel, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 689,
726 (2003); Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Suslow, Contemporary International
Cartels and Developing Countries: Economic Effects and Implications for Competi-
tion Policy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 801,851 (2004). Competition authorities in devel-
oped jurisdictions also have little incentive to prosecute or assist other agencies to
prosecute anti-competitive conduct where the detrimental welfare effects are ex-
ternal to their domestic market. See generally Andrew T. Guzman, Antitrust and
International Regulatory Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1142,1152 (2001); Andrew
T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1501, 1523
(1998); Michal S. Gal & Jorge A Padilla, The Follower Phenomenon: Implications
for the Design of Monopolization Rules in a Global Economy, 76 ANTITRUST L.J.
899,912 (2010).
38. In Brazil, the uncovering of cartels and prevention of anticompetitive behavior in
the retail fuel, cement, industrial and medicinal gas and salt markets have been
identified as directly beneficial to the poorest consumers. Org. for Econ.-Coopera-
tion and Dev. [OECD], Competition and Poverty Reduction: Contribution from
Brazil, Global Forum on Competition, DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2013)4, 3 (Jan. 15,
2013), http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=
DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2013)4&docLanguage=en. Cf Comp. Comm'n v Pioneer
Foods (Pty) Ltd 2010 ZACT 9, (SA) (effectively dismantling the bread cartel in
South Africa).
39. Niels Petersen, Antitrust Law and the Promotion of Democracy and Economic
Growth, at 20 (Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Res. on Collective Goods
Bonn 2011/3) (Jan. 2011).
40. See Competitive Advantage and Competition Policy in Developing Countries (Paul
Cook, Raul Fabella & Cassey Lee eds., 2007). Cf Todorov, Marciel & Filho, supra
note 2, 256-257; Simon J. Evenett, Links Between Development and Competition
Law in Developing Countries, at 5 (Case Stud. for the World Dev. Rep. 2005: Inv.
Climate, Growth and Poverty, 2003).
41. Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev. [OECD], Relationship Between Public and
Private Antitrust Enforcement - Brazil, DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2015)23, 2 http://
www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/
WP3/WD(2015)23&docLanguage=en [hereinafter Relationship Between Public
and Private Antitrust Enforcement]; Diffuse rights fund, INsTITUTO Socio-
AMBIENTAL, https://uc.socioambiental.org/en/fundos/diffuse-rights-fund (last vis-
ited Mar. 4, 2017).
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V. THE TRANSFER OF GLOBAL ANTITRUST EXPERTISE
AND VOLUNTARY "SOFT NORMS"
The recent reforms to competition law and institutions in Brazil closely
follow the recommendations of international antitrust experts and agen-
cies such as the ICN, 4 2 UNCTAD, 4 3 and the OECD.4 4 "With the collapse
of global initiatives to enact a multilateral competition agreement, 4 5
multi-jurisdictional issues are addressed by the extraterritorial application
of domestic competition law, 4 6 bilateral and regional agreements," 4 7 and
international antitrust institutions, which have been instrumental in ex-
porting expertise and institutional frameworks through the harmonisation
of competition rules and procedures by means of the convergence of soft
norms and "best practice". 4 8
Brazil was subject to "peer reviews" of its competition agencies by the
OECD in 200549 and again in 2010.5o While not a member of the OECD,
42. The ICN was established in 2001 as a forum for competition agencies. Today its
membership includes 117 competition agencies and a number of non-governmen-
tal advisors (NGAs). ICN STEERING GROuP, THE ICN's VISION FOR ITS SECOND
DECADE 1,7 (May 2001); Hugh M. Hollman & William E. Kovacic, The Interna-
tional Competition Network: Its Past, Current, and Future Role, 20 MINN. J. OF
INT'L L. 274, 274 (2011).
43. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) provides
technical assistance to competition agencies in developing countries. U.N. Confer-
ence on Trade and Development. See The U.N. Set of Principles and Rules on
Competition, at 18, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF/10/Rev.2 (2000).
44. Pro-competitive Policy Reforms, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/competition/re-
forms/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) [hereinafter Pro-Competitive Policy Reforms].
45. Many developing countries rejected the proposal for a multilateral competition
agreement through the World Trade Organization (WTO). World Trade Organiza-
tion, Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy
(WGTCP), WTO, http://www.wto.orglenglish/tratop-e/comp-e/comp-e.htm#docu
ments; see also WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1; Taimoon Stewart, The Fate of Competition Policy in
Canctin: Politics or Substance?, 31 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 7 (2004);
Aditya Bhattacharjea, The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Competition Pol-
icy: A Developing Country Perspective, 9 J. or INT'L ECON. L. 293-294, 302-303
(2006); David J. Gerber, Competition Law and the WTO: Rethinking the Relation-
ship, 10 J. OF INT'L ECON. L. 707, 710-711 (2007); D Daniel Sokol, Monopolists
Without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of International Antitrust in a Global
Gilded Age, 4 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 37, 51 (2007); Kathryn McMahon, Competition
law and developing economies: Between "informed divergence" and international
convergence in RESEARCiI HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW
209,211 (Ariel Ezrachi ed., Edward Elgar, 2012).
46. While a number of decisions have expanded the extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust law, the U.S. Supreme Court reasserted the importance of comity to deny
damages suits to foreign victims of the international global vitamins cartel. F
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004). But see
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 US 764, 769-770 (1993).
47. See generally, Michal Gal, Regional Competition Law Agreements: An Important
Step for Antitrust Enforcement, 60 UNIV. OF TORONTO L. Rvv. 239, 240 (2010).
48. ICN Steering Group, supra note 42.
49. Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev. [OECD], Competition Law and Policy in
Brazil: A Peer Review, at 7 (2005), https://www.oecd.org/brazil/35445196.pdf.
50. Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev. [OECD], Competition Law and Policy in
Brazil: A Peer Review, at 3 (2010), https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/45154362
.pdf [hereinafter Competition Law and Policy].
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Brazil has "observer" status and undergoes peer review on a voluntary
basis.51 These reviews were supplemented by a "follow-up" in 2012.52
These OECD reviews are comprehensive and contain an important level
of detail, scrutiny, as well as assessment of Brazilian competition law reg-
ulation.53 The impact of its recommendations on the reform process in
Brazil was acknowledged in their 201054 Review:
The [2005] Report contained several recommendations for further
improving competition policy in the country, many of which required
amendments to the competition law. Those amendments may now
finally be enacted. The 2005 Report also made other recommenda-
tions that did not depend on new legislation, most of which were
adopted. Finally, the report suggested changes to improve the legis-
lation that was then pending in the Congress, and many of those
were also accepted.55
The 2011 legislative reforms mirror the recommendations from these
OECD reviews including: streamlining and removal of overlapping ad-
ministrative functions between and among the competition agencies and
extension of commissioners' terms.56 Formal settlement procedures were
also introduced for mergers and anticompetitive conduct.57 Changes to
the merger review process included a more expedited review, introduc-
tion of pre-merger notification, the removal of a twenty percent market
share threshold and introduction of a local nexus requirement (calculated
on the basis of local relevant sales and/or the assets of the acquired party)
for merger notifications.58 In referring to these changes the Inter-Ameri-
51. An "observer" agrees "to associate themselves to certain Council Recommenda-
tions, to undergo a peer review exercise, to make written contributions to Commit-
tee roundtables, to actively participate in the Committee's outreach events and to
disseminate the Committee's recommendations and best practices to other author-
ities . . . At the expiration of the two year period . . . a review of the results
achieved by non-members invited during the expired period will be important.
There will be no presumption of renewal; it will be earned by performance." Org.
for Econ. Cooperation and Dev. (OECD), Pro-Active Strategy vis-d-vis non mem-
bers, DAF/COMP(2005)26 at 2 (June 16, 2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/
officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?doclanguage=en&cote=DAf/comp
(2005)26.
52. Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev. [OECD], Follow-up to the Nine Peer Re-
views of Competition Law and Policy of Latin American Countries: Argentina, Bra-
zil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama and Peru (2012),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/2012Follow-upNinePeer%20Review-en.pdf
[hereinafter Follow-up].
53. Competition Law and Policy, supra note 50, at 9.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 9.
56. Follow-up, supra note 52, at 37-40.
57. Competition Law and Policy, supra note 50, at 74-81.
58. See generally Abel M. Mateus, The New Brazilian Merger Control Regime, in Eu-
ROPEAN COMPETITION LAw ANNUAL 2010: MERGER CONTROL IN EUROPEAN AND
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Philip Lowe and Mel Marquis eds., 2013). The threshold
for mergers has been increased so that only larger transactions need to be notified
with a state-wide turnover of one of the companies of R$750 million. Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Annual Report on Com-
petition Policy Developments in Brazil: 2012, at 4, OECD Doc. DAF/COMP/
AR(2013)19 (May 21, 2013). The turnover threshold can be modified by a specific
2016] 301
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can Development Bank (IDB)/OECD stated: "[i]n the case of Brazil, the
new competition law eliminated the market share criterion in line with
the peer review recommendation." 5 9 In its report to the OECD, Brazil
specifically notes that the change to merger thresholds and removal of the
market share reference "is in accordance with international recommenda-
tions, that state that notification thresholds should be based exclusively
on objectively quantified criteria". 60
The amendments to the Brazilian merger regime also closely followed
the recommended practices of the ICN,6 1 which together with the
OECD, 62 has devoted a great deal of work to the harmonisation of
merger guidelines, with the goal of reducing transaction costs for the re-
view of multi-jurisdictional mergers through the streamlining of notifica-
tion procedures. The ICN invests considerable time and effort in
advocacy, the collection of data and monitoring compliance with these
merger practices. 63 Many competition agencies, including Brazil,64 have
brought their merger regimes into closer conformity with the ICN recom-
mendations.6 5 The ICN reports, for example, that "[t]wo-thirds of ICN
executive act, without discussion by Congress. Working Party No. 3 on Co-opera-
tion and Enforcement, Jurisdictional Nexus in Merger Control Regimes: Note by
Brazil, at 2, OECD Doc. DAF/COMP?WP3/WD(2016)23 (June 7, 2016).
59. The OECD observed that a number of economies, including Brazil, had amended
their notification thresholds in line with the Recommendation. See Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Report on Country Exper-
iences with the 2005 Recommendation on Merger Review, (2013), http://www.oecd
.org/daf/competition/ReportonExperienceswithMergerReviewRecommendation
.pdf; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Local
Nexus and Jurisdictional Thresholds in Merger Control, OECD Doc. DAF/COMP/
WP3(2016)4 (Mar. 10, 2016).
60. Working Party No. 3 on Co-operation and Enforcement, Jurisdictional Nexus in
Merger Control Regimes: Note by Brazil, at 2, OECD Doc. DAF/COMP?WP3/
WD(2016)23 (June 7, 2016) [hereinafter Working Party No. 3]. CADE still retains
some discretion to review mergers that do not comply with turnover thresholds but
have an anticompetitive effect in Brazil.
61. In particular, the ICN Merger Working Group's "Recommended Practices for
Merger Notification and Review Procedures." See International Competition Net-
work, Recommended Practices for Merger Notification and Review Procedures, IN-
TERNATIONALCOMPETITIONNETWORK.ORG, (Mar. 4, 2017), http://www.internation
alcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc588.pdf.
62. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Recommen-
dation of the Council on Merger Review, OECD Doc. C(2005)34 (Mar. 23, 2005).
63. Simon J. Evenett & Alexander Hijzen, Conformity with International Recommen-
dations on Merger Reviews: An Economic Perspective on "Soft Law," 1-51 (Uni-
versity of Nottingham & Leverhulme Centre, Research Paper No. 2006/04, 2006),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=893034.
64. The introduction of a 'local nexus requirement' for merger review was particularly
attributed to ICN recommendations. See Working Party No. 3, supra note 60.
Jenny notes that Brazil "adopted other measures recommended by the ICN such
as the fact that there is no deadline for pre-merger notification or the fact that the
Superintendent-General must explain his reasons when he declares a transaction
complex." Fr6d6ric Jenny, Substantive convergence in merger control: An Assess-
ment, 1 REVUE DES DROITS DE LA CONCURRENCE No. 1-2015, 21, 29 n. 15 (2015).
65. See Mariana Tavares de Araujo, Brazil: Implementing ICN's Recommended Prac-
tices, Annual Conference, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK [1CN] (2007),
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc420.pdf;
MARCO Bo-rrA, MERGER CONTROL REGIMES IN EMERGING ECONOMIEs: A CASE
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members that made changes to their merger control regimes cited the
ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Notification and Review Proce-
dures as having influenced their reforms." 66
The ICN and OECD belong to the emerging networks of decentralised
economic ordering in the global economy where rules are formulated by
regulators and technocrats, not sovereign states.67 This is described as a
form of "normative isomorphism" brought about by networks of expert
epistemic communities and international organizations who induce regu-
latory changes through the promotion of "best practices" and "peer re-
views." 68 As the OECD notes, "[t]here is an emerging international
consensus on best practices in competition law enforcement and the im-
portance of pro-competitive reform. Peer reviews are an important part
of this process." 69
Peer pressure and the promise of technical assistance are powerful
means for the achievement of conformity and compliance. 70 In this man-
ner developed countries can "effectively export their rules to the rest of
the world." 71 These rules are presented as purely technical standards,
which stand outside politics and do not require democratic deliberation.
As Pistor points out, "[t]he external supply of best practice law, while
facilitating more radical change than might be feasible without external
pressure, sterilizes the process of law-making from political and socio-
economic development, and thereby distances it from the process of con-
tinuous adaptation and innovation." 72
The OECD peer review system, particularly the economic surveys, has
been compared to a form of soft coordination through multilateral sur-
STUDY ON BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA (2011); Marco Botta, The Impact of Multi-
Jurisdictional Concentrations on the New Competition Law Jurisdictions, Case
Study on Brazil, in NEW COMPETITION JURISDICTIONS: SHAPING POLICIES AND
BUILDING INSTITUTIONs, 260 (Richard Whish and Christopher Towley eds., 2012).
66. ICN Steering Group, supra note 42, at 2.
67. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy through Government Net-
works, in TIHE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, 177 (Michael Byers ed.,
2001); Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance - and Not
Trade, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 623 (2010). Imelda Maher and Anestis Papadopolous,
Competition Agency Networks Around the World in Research Handbook on Int'l
Comp. Law, 60 (Ariel Ezrachi ed. 2012).
68. Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter M. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Iso-
morphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. Soc. REV.
147 (1983); Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International
Policy Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 1 (1992); Frank Dobbin, Beth Simmons, and
Geoffrey Garrett, The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction,
Coercion, Competition, or Learning?, 33 ANN. REV. Soc. 449 (2007).
69. Follow-up, supra note 52, at 3.
70. Eleanor M. Fox, Competition, development and regional integration: in search of a
competition law fit for developing countries, in COMPETITION POLICY AND RE-
GIONAL INTEGRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 273 (Josef Drexl, Mor
Bakhoum, Eleanor M. Fox, Michal S. Gal & David J. Gerber eds., 2012).
71. Brummer, supra note 67, at 642.
72. Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law Its Effect on Developing Economies,
G-24 Discussion Paper Series No. 4, at 2, (June 2000), http://www.g24.org/PDF/
g24-dp4.pdf.
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veillance where effectiveness depends on persuading reluctant actors. As
Armin Schafer points out:
Multilateral surveillance rests on peer review, i.e. on the mutual
monitoring and evaluation of national policies by other governments.
It is targeted at bringing states to behave in accordance with a code
of conduct or specific goals, at developing common standards and at
acquiring best practices through international comparison. Precisely
because there are no sanctions, this mode of governance builds on a
co-operative effort to criticize existing policies and generate new
ones.73
While more research is required regarding the impact and desirability
of these reforms in Brazil before any firm conclusions can be drawn, to
the extent that they closely follow the recommendations of international
experts, we can nevertheless begin to question their democratic basis and
legitimacy. While some of these reforms were subject to extensive debate
in both houses of Congress for a number of years, other adopted recom-
mendations, as the OECD points out, "did not depend on new legisla-
tion." 7 4 Democratic legitimacy questions are also raised by the work of
the ICN when norms are created by officials from competition agencies
who are joined by Non-Governmental Advisors (NGAs) from private
firms, think-tanks, and consultancies.
The views of global bodies and experts are persuasive in these circum-
stances and the adoption of these ideas can link regulatory institutions
together with international like-minded peers potentially bypassing more
pressing local concerns and democratic scrutiny. As the IDB/OECD
noted in its 2013 follow up to the Peer Review, "[t]he peer review thus
serves as a powerful international management tool for competition au-
thorities and it provides solid background support when arguing for legis-
lative change to improve a country's competition law and its overall
competitive environment." 7 5
The value of ICN recommendations to the Brazilian reform of the
merger regime and cartel enforcement was acknowledged by Mariana Ta-
vares de Araujo, a former member of SDE: "[a]mendments to the law
were supported by ICN materials, which were all very important to con-
vince government and private sector of need for change." 76
73. Armin Schdfer, A new form of governance? Comparing the open method of co-
ordination to multilateral surveillance by the IMF and the OECD, 13 J. EuR. Pun.
PoL'Y 70 (2006); Fabrizio Pagani, Peer Review: A Tool for Co-operation and
Change, An Analysis of an OECD Working Method, OECD Doc. SG/LEG(2002)1
(Sept. 11, 2002), http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/1955285.pdf. cf. The Open
Method of Co-ordination (OMC) in the EU operates a similar system of multilat-
eral surveillance through the use of guidelines and monitoring devices through
mechanisms such as the European Competition Network. See CIARLES F. SABEL
AND JONATHAN ZEITLIN EDS., EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE IN THE EURO-
PEAN UNION: TOWARDS A NEw ARCHITrEcruRE (2010).
74. Competition Law and Policy, supra note 50, at 9.
75. IDB/OECD, supra note 59, at 1.
76. Araujo, supra note 65, at 8.
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The OECD reviews are also followed up by extensive survey questions
where each jurisdiction is expected to answer a number of standardized
questions focused on justifications for non-implementation of recommen-
dations such as: "[i]f the recommendations have not been fully imple-
mented, describe those parts that have not been implemented and give
the reasons why, in your opinion, they have not been implemented."77
The adoption of global norms and the similar practices of peer organi-
zations, supported by burgeoning studies and research by experts, have
the advantage of economies of scale and efficiencies arising from network
effects.78 This is particularly true when policy choices are otherwise con-
strained by "bounded rationality," complexity, uncertainty, and an ab-
sence of "information and cognitive capacity to assess the cost and
benefits of each and every alternative."7 9 In these circumstances, "orga-
nizations are rewarded for being similar to other organizations in their
fields"80 and divergence, while possible, is costly.81 Harmonized regimes
also foster cooperation and exchange of information. Investment and
trade opportunities are also enhanced, as the "follower" jurisdiction has
demonstrated its commitment to the control of dominance and prosecu-
tion of cartels.82
It is also true, however, that harmonized regimes and the streamlining
of procedures for merger review align most clearly with the interests of
global commerce and its demands for standardized rules, removal of reg-
ulatory trade burdens, and reduction of transaction costs for global merg-
ers. These approaches, not surprisingly, have tended to serve the
domestic welfare interests of the more powerful and developed antitrust
jurisdictions, and have had limited success as far as developing countries
are concerned. As Fox observes, "the ICN agenda is principally set and
the norms principally forged by the developed world."83
The invocation of the ICN and OECD standards as international best
practices becomes a powerful and apparently apolitical and neutral stan-
dard for critique of local law and regulatory processes. The Merger
Streamlining Group, for example, which has representatives of the pri-
vate bar and multinational firms, actively engages in the monitoring of
compliance with the ICN merger guidelines by individual competition
agencies. 84 The Group claimed to be influential in the adoption by Bra-
77. Follow-up, supra note 52, at 64.
78. See DiMaggio and Powell, supra note 68; Fox, supra note 70.
79. Dobbin et al., supra note 68, at 452.
80. DiMaggio and Powell, supra note 68, at 153.
81. Fox, supra note 70.
82. Gal and Padilla, supra note 37.
83. Eleanor M. Fox, Linked-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual Network, 43 INT'L
LAW. 151, 152 (2009).
84. The Merger Streamlining Group is "a group of multinational firms interested in
ensuring that international merger review regimes operate effectively and effi-
ciently and do not impose undue burdens . . . . [It] pursues this mission through
direct submissions to competition agencies and governments . . . . The Interna-
tional Competition Network's Recommended Practices for Merger Notification are
used as a benchmark for identifying and advocating changes to non-compliant re-
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zil, and other jurisdictions, of the "local nexus requirement" for merger
notifications.8 5
In order to optimize the benefits of the design and implementation of
competition legislation for developing and emerging economies, it is im-
portant that the particular market context of the jurisdiction be taken
into account.8 6 In this way the simple transfer/transplant of an existing
regime, chosen from one of the dominant and established models in the
United States or European Union, is not the optimal solution. While ho-
mogeneity and convergence of global competition laws may be desirable
for the efficient transaction of international business, this approach fails
to recognize that the success of these regimes more often demands atten-
tion to divergence, adaptation, and learning.87 Programs of technical as-
sistance are found to be more effective to the extent they do not merely
impose simple solutions but consider the political, cultural,8 8 and eco-
nomic context of each jurisdiction.89 While the success of the ICN may
be measured by convergence, reducing the "[p]otential chilling effects
from differing substantive standards and polices" and "duplicative proce-
dures," 90 the divergent interests of developing countries remain largely
unrecognised.9 1 A failure to acknowledge these factors may account for
the mixed results of competition law transplants in various jurisdictions. 92
The achievement of perfect international convergence is also an impos-
sible goal. As Fr6diric Jenny argues, attempts towards full harmoniza-
tion of merger rules will always prove elusive (and unrealistic) given the
number of competition regimes in the global economy.93 There will al-
gimes." McMillan Ltd. Liab. P'Ship [LLP], Merger Streamlining Group, MCMIL-
LAN LLP, http://www.mcmillan.ca/webfiles/Merger%20Steamlining%20Group.pdf
(last visited Mar. 6, 2017, 11:20 AM).
85. Id.
86. Eduardo P. Motta, Competition Policy and Trade in the Global Economy: Towards
and Integrated Approach, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINA-
BLE DEVELOPMENT & WORLD ECONoMIC FORuM (2016), http://www3.weforum
.org/docs/E15/WEFCompetititionPolicyTrade GlobalEconomyTowardsInte
gratedApproach-report 2015_1401.pdf.
87. Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor, and Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant
Effect, 51 AM. J. Comp. L. 163 (2003); Competition Policy Implementation Work-
ing Group, Lessons To Be Learnt From The Experiences Of Young Competition
Agencies, INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK (May 3-5, 2006), http://www.international
competitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc369.pdf.
88. Thomas K. Cheng, How Culture May Change Assumptions in Antitrust Policy, in
THE GLOBAL LIMITS OF COMPETITION LAw 205 (loannis Lianos and D. Daniel
Sokol eds., 2012).
89. Michael W. Nicholson, D. Daniel Sokol, and Kyle W. Stiegert, Assessing the effi-
ciency of antitrust/competition policy technical assistance programs, INT'L COMPETI-
TION NETWORK (May 3-5, 2006), http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/
uploads/library/doc428.pdf.
90. ICN Steering Group, supra note 42.
91. Michal S. Gal, Antitrust in a Globalized Economy: The Unique Enforcement Chal-
lenges Faced by Small and Developing Jurisdictions, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. I
(2009). Alternatives to the dominance of the US and EU models are beginning to
emerge, however, such as the signing of the MoU by the BRICS competition
authorities.
92. Berkowitz et al., supra note 87, at 165-165.
93. Jenny, supra note 64.
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ways be legitimate justifications for substantive and procedural diver-
gence grounded in the pursuit of differing competition goals, market size,
and industrial policy, particularly for developing and emerging econo-
mies. 94 In Brazil, the introduction of pre-merger review may, for exam-
ple, place a strain on already limited resources 9 5 and shift them away
from other priorities. While the changes to the merger threshold should
reduce the number of transactions subject to review, 96 CADE approval
will become necessary for the conclusion of transactions and there will be
increased pressure on officials within tight time frames. 97
Brazilian Supreme Court Judge Ricardo Villas B6as Cueva has also
argued that some aspects of "transplanted" antitrust regimes are not im-
mediately suited to a civil law jurisdiction:
The judicial examination of antitrust cases might be hampered not
only by the intrinsic complexity of economic analysis but also by un-
necessary misuse of a legal jargon derived from uncritical import of
legal concepts, mostly from the common law-based American sys-
tem. The practitioners of antitrust law in Brazil, as well as the staff
and members of the competition authorities, tend indeed to clutter
up their petitions, reports and decisions with language that is not eas-
ily understandable by judges, who are usually not familiar with the
common law culture-and are not supposed to know it anyway-
since the legal system in Brazil is based on the civil law model from
continental Europe.98
He goes on to describe one example of this "cultural misapprehension"
as the import of American standards of proof for antitrust infringements,
which he argues are better suited to jury trials.99 Cueva acknowledges
that standards of proof and safe harbors 00 can foster legal certainty and
predictability in competition law adjudication where the alternative
would be a full-scale "rule of reason" assessment of economic facts. 10 1
He, however, also suggests that these can be absorbed in the civil law
system through better clarification, and greater utilization, of the formal
nature of the infringement as "formal" (per se) or "material" (depen-
dence on effect) rather than reliance on standards of proof.102 The diffi-
culty with this approach is that in competition law it is often impossible to
draft a legislative provision (even in civil law jurisdictions) that would
encapsulate the multiple instances of abusive conduct.
94. Id.
95. Todorov, Marciel & Filho, supra note 2, at 253.
96. Id. at 251.
97. Id.
98. Ricardo Villas B6as Cueva, Judicial Review of Antitrust Decisions in Brazil, 2013
FORDH[AM COMPETITION L. INsT. 395, 399. .
99. Id.
100. An agreement or merger may have to reach a certain market share threshold
before it will be evaluated for anti-competitive concerns.
101. Id.
102. Cueva, supra note 98, at 399-400.
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VI. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM OF COMPETITION AGENCIES
AND THE "REGULATORY STATE"
The reforms to the institutional structure of competition law in Brazil
also coincide with the value placed on depoliticized, autonomous institu-
tions and the technocratic application of neutral rules in the "regulatory
state"1 03 where there is a concern for market outcomes rather than redis-
tribution (in a "welfare state") and "legitimacy is accorded to de-
politicized expert knowledge."1 0 4
A number of semi-autonomous regulatory institutions, known as "au-
tarchies," were created in Brazil in order to carry out decentralized state
economic activities during the period of liberalization and privatization in
the late 1990s.10 5 These institutions were relatively new and not always a
welcome phenomenon in Brazil since their role was closely associated
with the "state in transition" as it withdrew from economic activities. 106
Since 1994, competition agencies in Brazil have been similarly created
as an "autarchy," linked to the Ministry of Justice. 07 The 2011 reforms
aimed to further increase the independence and regulatory powers of the
competition institutions, streamlining and removing overlapping roles. 0 8
The increase in the terms of office of the CADE President and Commis-
sioners to four years, and new provisions for reappointment were made in
"line with the suggestions made by the OECD's report." 109 This coin-
cided with a growing professionalization and specialization of the regula-
tory personnel. The number of economists and level of training in
economics for regulators were prioritized,1"0 and professionals with
North American educational credentials"' were sought after, and ap-
pointed to, the agencies. Luciano Timm notes that many of CADE's
economists have U.S. doctorates and that U.S. antitrust law is therefore
"highly persuasive," although "CADE would not refrain from judging a
103. THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS ALSO LINKS INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE
WITH ECONOMIC GROWTH. See generally DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTI-
TUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (Cambridge Univ. Press,
1991); Karen Yeung, The Regulatory State, in THE OXFORD HAND300K OF REGU-
LATION 64-85 (Robert Baldwin et al., 2010); Colin Scott, From Welfare State to
Regulatory State: Meta-Regulation and Beyond, 11 U. OF TOKYO J. OF L. & POL. 2,
(2014); Giandomenico Majone, The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe, 17.3
WEST Eun. POL. 77-101 (1994).
104. NAVROz K. DU3ASH & BRONWEN MORGAN, TIE RISE OF TIE REGULATORY
STATE OF THE SOUTH: INFRASTRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT IN EMERGING
ECONOMIES, 10 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2013).
105. An Overview of Brazilian Law, supra note 33, at 13.
106. Alexandre W. Nester, supra note 33, at 20.
107. Roundtable on changes, supra note 31, at 7.
108. Id.
109. Annual Report, supra note 58, at 7.
110. In 2009, CADE created a Department of Economic Studies (DEE), comprising
full time economists, which were to be integrated with the Technical Group in
Economics, created in 2008. Their activities included conducting a number of "in-
ternal training sessions, participating in international forums on antitrust econom-
ics, and in bi-lateral consultations with expert economist from other jurisdictions."
Competition Law and Policy in Brazil, supra note 50 at 38-39.
111. Id., supra note 50, at 46.
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case adapted to the Brazilian market." 112 As DiMaggio and Powell point
out:
To the extent managers and key staff are drawn from the same uni-
versities and filtered on a common set of attributes, they will tend to
view problems in a similar fashion, see the same policies, procedures
and structures as normatively sanctioned and legitimated, and ap-
proach decisions in much the same way.
113
Brazilian expertise has also been exported. 114 Brazilian officials have
provided technical assistance and trainee programs for other competition
agencies in Latin America, as transferred knowledge and expertise are
further circulated to other institutions and jurisdictions.1 15
Dubash and Morgan point out, however, that the regulatory state in
the South does not always correspond to a depoliticized entity.1 16 Rather
it is positioned on a spectrum between "rules and deals", and shaped by a
modified and expanded range of contextual factors"'7 where autonomous
institutions applying neutral rules give way to a more "embedded" regu-
latory state. Politicized institutions engage in "deals" with stakeholders
to achieve distributive, perhaps more politically expedient, outcomes
such as equitable access to water and electricity." 8 A broader regulatory
space emerges, which is inhabited by the courts, civil society, and bureau-
cratic networks." 9
Increased specialization and insulation from politics may therefore not
always be desirable in an emerging or developing economy. Competition
agencies, for example, may want to assume a number of roles with mixed
and broader functions normally undertaken by sector-specific regulators
such as licensing, standard-setting, utility access regulation, and consumer
protection legislation.1 20 This has not been the approach in Brazil; how-
ever, the competition agency is solely vested with the competition regula-
tion of sector specific areas (subject to some remaining jurisdictional
disputes in areas such as bankingl2') leaving non-competition issues to be
resolved by the specialist sector regulators. In keeping with this desire to
112. Luciano B. Timm, Jurisdiction, Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy in
Brazilian International Antitrust Law, in COOPERATION, COMITY, AND COMPETI-
TION POLICY 80 (Andrew T. Guzman 2011).
113. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 68, at 153.
114. Competition Law and Policy in Brazil, supra note 50 at 50-51.
115. Id.
116. Dubash & Morgan, supra note 104, at 2.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 283.
119. Id.
120. Michal S. Gal, The Ecology of Antitrust: Preconditions for Competition Law En-
forcement in Developing Countries, 15 (N.Y. U. Law & Econ, Working Paper,
2004), http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//ditcclp20041chl-en.pdf.
121. CADE shares authority for review of banking mergers with the Central Bank
(BACEN). PINI-mlEo NETO, DOING BUSINESS IN BRAZIL 26-23 (2013); Competi-
tion Law and Policy in Brazil, supra note 77 at 67; *Alexandre W. Nester, Control
of the Regulatory Agencies in INFRASTRUCTURE LAW OF BRAZIL ( Margal J. Filho
et al., 2016); Bruno M. Salama & Thiago J. Pinheiro, Citizens vs. Banks: Institu-
tional Drivers of Financial Market Litigiousness in Brazil, 11-13, 16 (Working Pa-
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"depolitize" and streamline roles, the 2012 reforms also separated the
consumer protection functions from the competition agency and created
a new body, the National Consumer Secretariat. 122
Competition agencies in developing and emerging economies can also
be expected to play an important role in "competition advocacy," which
includes the promotion of government policy to assess industrial policy,
regulatory review of anticompetitive legislation, reviews of technical stan-
dards, competition market studies, and the implementation of measures
to remove antitrust immunity and ensure competitive neutrality between
public and private enterprises.1 23 In Brazil, this role has been an impor-
tant counterweight to the powerful producer groups, which have lobbied
for price controls and special protections, for example. 124 Regulatory in-
dependence and autonomy are valued in these circumstances in order to
diminish the potential for rent-seeking, political influence, and capture. 125
But as Frid6ric Jenny points out, more politicized institutions also have
an important role to play. 126 There can be a trade-off between the inde-
pendence of the competition authority and the ability to access important
"insider" government information available to a more politicized body
with strong links to the executive, which is required to achieve effective
advocacy.127
In Brazil, SEAE historically had an important role in competition ad-
vocacy. 128 The OECD cautioned, however, that its home in the Ministry
of Finance made it "more susceptible to political influence than would
that of an independent agency"1 29 but also observed that it may be useful
to have "integration of the agency into the government system to be bet-
ter-placed to engage and influence policy-making." 130 It is not surprising,
therefore, that the OECD specifically recommended setting up mecha-
nisms to enable SEAE to participate in legislative reform of the regulated
sectors.13 1 The 2011 reforms put this recommendation in place. 132 While
SEAE still maintains a role in competition advocacy, with more recent
reforms it has been removed completely from competition law enforce-
ment, and SDE has been dismantled.13 3 It remains to be seen whether
this demarcation of functions will have an adverse effect on competition
per, 2013), http://direitosp.fgv.br/sites/direitosp.fgv.br/files/arquivos/anexos/draft
of may31_2013_-_brunom._salama.pdf.
122. Annual Report, supra note 58, at 7.
123. Competition Law and Policy, supra note 50, at 50-51.
124. Center for Co-operation with Non-Members, Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and
Enterprise Affairs, supra note 34, at 18.
125. Frederic Jenny, Competition Authorities: Independence and Advocacy in the
Global Limits of Comp. Law 205 (Joannis Lianos and D. Daniel Sokol eds. 2012).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 169.
128. Competition Law and Policy in Brazil, supra note 50 at 68-72.
129. Id. at 69.





advocacy in the future, or whether a more politicized role may have per-
mitted the pursuit of other legitimate industrial policy goals. These indus-
trial policy goals, together with competition law, are similar to the
position between "rules and deals," characteristic of institutions in the
"regulatory south." 1 3 4
This more political role for competition law institutions is not confined
to the "regulatory south." Western governments throughout history have
readily intruded on the "autonomy" of competition agencies. During the
global financial crisis, for example, competition authorities were either
not consulted by the executive on crucial issues impacting competition
policy, or their recommendations were side-stepped or ignored.' 3 5 The
courts have also had a fundamental role to play in the political develop-
ment of competition policy. For example, Kovacic and Shapiro have
traced how the U.S. Supreme Court has shaped U.S. antitrust policy for
over a century since the early interpretation of the Sherman Act in 1890,
its reaction to political and economic events such as the Great Depression
and the New Deal, and its changing attitudes to collusion and coopera-
tion, protectionism, and global competition.1 36
These brief examples demonstrate that autonomous and depoliticized
competition institutions are merely idealized versions of the transplanted
"western model." The use of competition law and policy as an enforce-
ment tool has always been highly political and inextricably linked with
ideas surrounding the role of the state within the economy.137
134. Dubash & Morgan, supra note 104, at 2.
135. In 2008 the UK competition regulator, the Office Fair Trading (OFT) (now the
Competition & Markets Authority (CMA)) had advised that the merger of two
major banks Lloyds TSB and HBOS should be referred to the Competition Com-
mission (now CMA) because it could threaten competition in banking services to
small and medium sized enterprises and in mortgage markets. Anticipated Acquisi-
tion by Lloyds TSB PLC of HBOSPLC: Report to the Secretary of State for Busi-
ness Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING 97 (Oct. 24,
2008), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5592bba440f0b6156400000c/
LLloydstsb.pdf jsessionid.4EBCDA0A4B36535AF8355B90D18E00A2.pdf; The
UK Secretary of State however cleared the merger with no reference to the Com-
petition Commission. The Competition Appeals Tribunal on judicial review up-
held the decision. Helen Davies & Richard Blakely, Merger Action Group v.
Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, GCP 2 (2009),
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/0d358061ellf2708ad9d626
34c6c40ad/Davies-May-09_1_.pdf.
136. William Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and
Legal Thinking, 14 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 43, 45, 47-48 (2000), http://faculty
.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/century.pdf.
137. These same political concerns, for example, have influenced the changing attitudes
to the regulation of cartel behavior. While today most would recognize cartels as
the "supreme evil of antitrust," this was not the dominant view in Europe where in
the early part of the twentieth century European cartels were not merely tolerated
but embraced as a remedy for unstable market behavior during the period of in-
dustrialization. Verizon Commc'n v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540
U.S. 398, 408 (2004); see generally CI-IRISTOPHER HARDING & JULIAN JOSHUA,
REGULATING CARTELS IN EUROPE: A STUDY OF LEGAL CONTROL OF CORPO-
RATE DELINQUENCY 27 (1st Ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 2003).
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Many of the recent reforms to Brazilian competition law and regula-
tion can be traced to similar approaches in other jurisdictions and follow
closely conceptions of the "regulatory state" and recommendations made
in "peer reviews" of Brazilian competition regulation by international an-
titrust experts and agencies such as the ICN and OECD. While the im-
plementation of international harmonized regimes can have beneficial
effects, it is also true that they are often applied, particularly in emerging
and developing countries, with little regard for the institutional, cultural,
and economic context. The second part of this article will trace these
concerns in a particular policy area: the shift in Brazilian competition law
from judicial review to the increasing use of extra-judicial "settlement" of
competition disputes. It will demonstrate how the local institutional con-
text acts to modify the importation (and perhaps effectiveness) of a har-
monized settlement regime.
VII. THE USE OF SETTLEMENTS IN BRAZILIAN
COMPETITION LAW
In "peer reviews," the OECD encouraged CADE to make more use of
its settlement powers1 38 and promoted the model, used by many interna-
tional competition agencies, that settlements together with leniency, pro-
vide an effective deterrent to cartel behavior. Deterrence is very much
dependent, however, on the institutional framework for enforcement. 13 9
It requires the intersection of a number of finely balanced factors, which
reduce uncertainty and risk for the applicant by minimizing exposure to
criminalization and/or private damages. 140 The operation of the Brazilian
cartel settlement program provides a good example of how institutional
and cultural factors can demand adaptation and even resistance to the
mere transfer of an international harmonized model. Extensive modifica-
tion, however, can also disrupt expected outcomes and undermine effec-
tiveness. In Brazil, the dominant driver for settlements was not to just to
promote deterrence but also to alleviate court bottlenecks and save
agency resources.141 As the OECD suggests, a settlement scheme in the
absence of a strong and effective system of enforcement and penalty by
the judiciary can undermine its deterrent value and should be used "very
cautiously." 142
138. Competition Law and Policy, supra note 50, at 80; Follow-up, supra note 52, at 40.
139. DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUcTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCE-
MENT 175 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2011).
140. Policy Roundtables: Plea Bargaining, OECD 13, 43 (2006), https://www.oecd.org/
competition/cartels/40080239.pdf.
141. Id. at 9.
142. Id. at 43.
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VIII. THE DECLINE IN EFFECTIVENESS OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF COMPETITION LAW DECISIONS
The 1988 Brazilian Constitution laid down a constitutional foundation
for competition policy, Article 173, paragraph 4 provides that "[t]he law
shall repress the abuse of economic power that aims at the domination of
markets, the elimination of competition, and the arbitrary increase of
profits," and Article 170 states that the "economic order" of Brazil shall
be "founded on the appreciation of the value of human work and on free
enterprise" and shall operate "in accordance with the dictates of social
justice" with "due regard" for certain principles, including "free competi-
tion."1 43 A constitutional foundation for competition law is rare and has
few equivalents in other jurisdictions. 144 Unlike other areas of social pol-
icy where courts have played a more interventionist and redistributive
role, these provisions have not translated to actionable individual rights
in the area of competition law.14 5 Therefore, the courts unlike the United
States, have not played a dominant role in development and evolution of
competition law and policy in Brazil.
Competition law also does not readily give rise to individual socio-eco-
nomic rights, which can be used by consumers to challenge anti-competi-
tive conduct in courts. Damages to consumers as a result of
anticompetitive action are usually small and fragmented. While competi-
tion law benefits consumers, it does so indirectly through the fostering of
competitive markets.14 6 Collective actions and litigation by consumer
groups can be a solution but these require a receptive and developed civil
litigation system.147
The effectiveness of enforcement is also largely dependent on the qual-
ity of tools for the detection of infringements and the efficacy of investi-
gations, decision-making, and judicial appeals. While recent legislative
reforms have been important, competition law in Brazil still faces institu-
tional deficiencies particularly in regard to the considerable delays in ju-
dicial proceedings and delayed payment of fines.148 CADE has a
143. Constituiqdo Federal [C.F.][Constitution] art. 170, 173 (Braz.).
144. It does have similarities, however, to the European notion of an "economic consti-
tution" which is linked to the historical foundations of European Union competi-
tion law in the economic ideas of the German "ordo-liberalists." DAVID J.
GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE: PROTECTING
PROMETHEUs, 232 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1998); Heike Schweitzer, The History, In-
terpretation and Underlying Principles of Sec. 2 Sherman Act and Art. 82 EC, in
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL: A REFORMED APPROACH TO ARTICLE
82 EC, (Dieter Ehlermann & Mel Marquis 2007).
145. This more interventionist role for the court is also considered to go beyond merely
'a bolstering of the boundaries of the regulatory state.' Dubash & Morgan, supra
note 104, at 13.
146. See generally Kovacic and Shapiro, supra note 136
147. See discussion of private damages below.
148. Carlos Ragazzo & Diogo Andrade, Beyond Detection: The Management of Cartel
Cases, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, INC. 1,2 (2012), www.competitionpolicyinterna
tional.com.
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relatively small budget for the number and length of investigations.1 49
While there has been a steady increase in fines, particularly for abuse of
dominance and cartels, there are few cartel prosecutions relative to an
economy ranked ninth largest by GDP in the world. 50
A shortage of human resources and procedural instruments thaaaat
permit both an increased number of suits and number of appeals has also
contributed to court delays. 151 CADE's final decisions cannot be ap-
pealed at the administrative level, but a Constitutional guarantee, which
permits judicial review of "any injury or threat to a right," potentially
opens up all competition law decisions to substantive review. 5 2
Azevedo points out that the average length of court proceedings, at
just below five years,15 3 is considerably above the average of three years
in countries surveyed by the ICN, including Brazil, in their review of
"Competition and the Judiciary."1 54 Lawsuits where a CADE decision is
contentious can last up to ten years.15 5 This is particularly problematic
for mergers. For example, some complex merger cases have been un-
resolved for seven to ten years.1 56 This is within the context of a general
court system, which is already under strain.' 5 7
Cueva claims that the delays in litigation in Brazil can be partly attrib-
uted to the "lack of clear definition of the standard of judicial review of
administrative acts."1 58 The problems faced by judicial review in Brazil
are exacerbated by the problems faced in all competition law jurisdictions
that determine the appropriate boundary between deference to the "tech-
149. The volume of cases undertaken by CADE is large. In 2012 there were "over 300
cases involving anticompetitive practices roughly 120 of which are cartel investiga-
tions in several markets." Id. at 3.
150. Todorov & Filho, supra note 2, at 207, 242.
151. Yeung & Azevedo, supra note 8, at 344.
152. Constituigio Federal [C.F.][Constitution] art. 5 (Braz.). For a discussion of the
legal basis for judicial review of CADE's decisions see Pedro Cristofaro, Judicial
Review of CADE's Decisions, in OVERVIEW OF COMPETITION LAW IN BRAZIL 372,
397 (Cristianne Zarzur et al., 2015).
153. Azevedo, supra note 8, at 4. The data (which relates to Law 8.884) is based on a
lengthy study of judicial decisions in Brazil. See Juliano Souza de Albuqerque
Maranhdo et. al, Direito Regulatdrio e Concorrencial no poder Judicidrio (Singular
ed., 2014).
154. Azevedo, supra note 8, at 4; International Competition Network, Competition and
the Judiciary: a Report on a Survey on the Relationship between Competition Au-
thorities and the Judiciary 15 (2006).
155. Azevedo, supra note 8, at 4-5; Todorov & Filho, supra note 2, at 251.
156. The Nestle-Garoto merger case was under review for 14 years. Azevedo, supra
note 4, at 4-5.
157. Yeung and Azevedo point out that in the Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Fed-
eral) an average process takes 14 years to complete and "the 11 justices at the STF
collectively decided more than 130,000 cases in the year 2008 and 150,000 in 2007.
This heavy workload is not particular to the Supreme Court: any judge in Brazil is,
on average, responsible for 10,000 cases at any moment in time." Yeung &
Azevedo, supra note 8, at 344.
158. Cueva, supra note 98, at 397. The difficulty in drawing appropriate lines of author-
ity between the regulator and the courts in competition law is readily apparent in a
number of EU judicial decisions. See Case T-342/99, Airtours v Comm'n, 2002
E.C.R. 11-2585; Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval BV v Comm'n, 2002, 5 C.M.L.R. 28.
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nical discretion" of the regulator and the assessment of "legality" by the
courts. 1 5 9 Decision-making by both regulators and courts about competi-
tion law is highly fact-intensive with significant reliance on experts and
economic theory for both the formulation of legal rules and their applica-
tion in complex contexts. 16 0
Brazil, together with other Latin American countries, has adopted the
French civil law system of administrative law.161 Traditionally, the civil
law system permitted substantive merits-based review of administrative
action while, in the common law, there has been more willingness to de-
fer to the expertise of the decision-maker while ensuring procedural regu-
larities (such as procedural fairness) and legality based on rational and
reasonable decision-making.1 62 These questions about the appropriate
institutional role and boundaries of administrative discretion vis-A-vis the
courts are further complicated in the context of an extensive and compli-
cated system of judicial review in Brazil, which not only has a weak sys-
tem of precedent, 63 but also has a jurisprudence that emerged from a
long history of military dictatorship and a more interventionist role for
government in the economy and civil society.1 64
The perceived response of international agencies to this complexity
seeks to strengthen the technocratic economic knowledge base of the ju-
diciary.1 65 In its review of "Competition and the Judiciary," the ICN con-
cluded that there was a "lack of specialized knowledge on competition
issues by the judiciary"1 66 and stated that "[w]hat is identified by the re-
sults of the report is the urgency to bring judges closer to the technical
analysis made by competition authorities, especially in developing coun-
tries."1 67 Furthermore, it called this "an important conclusion for provid-
ers of technical assistance. . . ."168 The OECD has also suggested
designating specialist judges and establishing appellate panels to resolve
competition law issues, and judges in Brazil already attend judicial semi-
nars on competition policy.1 69 But, this may only serve to further confine
159. See generally, Jose Carlos Laguna de Paz, Understanding the limits of judicial re-
view in EU competition law, 2(1) JOURNAL OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 203-224
(2014).
160. Id.
161. See generally, Frances Bignami, Comparative Administrative Law, in The Cam-
bridge Companion to Comparative Law 145-170 (Mawro Bussami & Ugo Mattei
eds. 2012).
162. See generally, Francis Bignami, Comparative Administrative Law, in THE CAM-
BRIDGE COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 145-170 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mat-
tei eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012).
163. Keith Rosenn, Judicial Review in Brazil: Developments under the 1998 Constitu-
tion, 7 Sw. J.L. & TRADE IN THE AMs. 291, 291-319 (2000).
164. Id. at 305.
165. See generally, International Competition Network, Competition and the Judiciary:
a Report on a Survey on the Relationship between Competition Authorities and the
Judiciary, 17 (2007).
166. Id. at 17.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Competition Law and Policy, supra, note 50, at 80.
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judicial decision-making to a purely technocratic/ "scientific" adjudica-
tion and exclude the possibility of taking into account broader "constitu-
tional" public policy issues.170
The threat of judicial review and the number of appeals under the 1994
Act did, however, have a positive impact on the quality of CADE's sub-
stantive decision-making and administrative processes, including im-
provements to its by-laws, increased transparency, and due process. 17 1
More recently there has been a decline in the number of appeals, and the
judicial review which does take place is also unlikely to have a real effect
on modifying or streamlining administrative procedures given that those
who seek judicial review are more likely to use it tactically, taking advan-
tage of court delays to challenge the fine and CADE decision.172 As
Azevedo argues, this adverse selection of cases "subverts the role of the
judiciary, whose capabilities should be employed to adjudicate legitimate
disputes and not to postpone a predictable outcome and, hence, uninten-
tionally mitigate the enforcement of competition law."1 7 3 Postponement
can also be a useful strategy for the firm because the responsible execu-
tive board may have been replaced by the time the fine is due.174
IX. THE SHIFT TO SETTLEMENT
The delays and costs of court proceedings have provided a strong in-
centive for an increased number of extra-judicial settlements.1 75 Settle-
ments or Cease and Desist Agreements (Termo de Compromisso de
Cessagio (TCC)) were introduced for antitrust decisions in 1994,176 but
they were prohibited in cartel decisions so as not to discourage use of
leniency, which was introduced in 2000 (the first application was in
2003).177 CADE also actively promoted settlements in its negotiations
with defendants, introducing training in negotiation for its staff and im-
170. See generally id.
171. Azevedo, supra note 8, at 6.
172. Azevedo points out that courts confirmed 73.9% of CADE's decisions and that
this has been steadily increasing to over 80% since 2008. See id. at 5.
173. Id. at 6.
174. See generally, Wounter Wills, Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the An-
swer?, 28 World Comp. 117 (2005). Further reforms now require a mandatory de-
posit of the fine or similar bond or guarantee, pending final decision by the court,
and elimination of the alternative of a fine to jail time. See Todorov & Filho, supra
note 2, at 233, 251.
175. Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Antitrust Settlements in Ti-m OxFolio HANDBOOK OF INTER-
NATIONAL ANTITRUST EcoNoMics 173 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, eds.,
Oxford, 2014).
176. Decreto No. 8.884, de 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 6.6.1994
(Braz.).
177. Decreto No. 10.149, de 2000, DiAio OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 12.21.2000
(Braz.); Decreto No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro 2011, DIAiio OFICIAL D)A UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 1.12.2011 (Braz.) art. 86; Administrative Counsel for Economic De-
fense, Guidelines - CADE's Antitrust Leniency Program 14 (2016). http://en.cade
.gov.br/topics/publications/guidelines/guidelines-cades-antitrust-leniency-program-
final.pdf. For the relationship between leniency and settlements see discussion
below.
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plementing a settlement policy as an alternative to judicial review178
The introduction of leniency agreements for cartels and the possibility
of making dawn raids with court authorization equipped the competition
authorities with more effective tools of investigation and improved tech-
niques for the uncovering of evidence, such as electronic surveillance.1 7 9
While this increased the number of cartel prosecutions,1 8 0 it also led to a
growth in court cases that contributed to bottlenecks in judicial review.s18
In the absence of the possibility of settlement for cartel proceedings,
those unable to take advantage of leniency shifted their interest from
challenging the substance of an infringement to questioning the procedu-
ral issues regarding the legality and validity of evidence.1 82 These court
proceedings reallocated limited agency resources from enforcement to
defending these legal challenges.1 83
The 1994 law was amended again in 2007 to permit CADE to include
cartel decisions among those that could be settled.1 84 Various reforms to
the settlement procedures were introduced in 2012,185 and in 2016 CADE
issued TCC Guidelines for cartel cases.1 86 Brazil also adopted the ICN's
"Anti-Cartel Enforcement Template" to provide information to ICN
members on its cartel enforcement strategy.8 7
There are powerful incentives for the company to settle including say-
178. Azevedo, supra note 8, at 6.
179. Decreto No. 10.149, de 2000, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 12.21.2000
(Braz.); See Leonardo Maniglia Duarte & Rodrigo Alves Dos Santos, Cartel Settle-
ments in Brazil: Recent Developments and Upcoming Challenges, in OVERVIEW OF
COMPETITION LAW IN BRAZIL, 288, 285-313 (Cristianne Zarzur et al. eds, IBRAC,
2015).
180. Paulo Furquim de Azevedo & Alexandre Lauri Henriksen, Cartel Deterrence and
Settlements: the Brazilian Experience, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION
LAW: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES (Roger Zach et al., eds., 2010) at 211-212. The num-
ber of convictions obtained by CADE has been increasing. In 2013 CADE had
convictions in 22 cases which was more than the total number of convictions in the
previous five years put together.
181. Id.
182. Azevedo & Henriksen, supra note 180, at 213; Duarte & Dos Santos, supra note
179, at 289; Ragazzo & Thomson de Andrade, supra note 148, at 2.
183. Ragazzo and Thomson de Andrade, supra note 148, at 2.
184. Decreto No. 11.482, 31de maio de 2007, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
5.31.2007 (Braz.); in September 2007, the CADE issued Resolution No. 46/2007
setting out the negotiation rules.
185. See Gabriel Nogueira Dias et al, Unraveling the Brazilian Antitrust Settlement
Practice, in ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM COMPETITION LAW INSTI-
TUTE: INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY 73 (Barry E. Hawk ed., Juris,
2014).
186. CADE, Guidelines: Cease and Desist Agreement for Cartel Cases (2016), http://
en.cade.gov.br/noticias-anexos/guidelines-tcc.pdf/view. The guidelines are non-
binding and were provided for in Article 85 of Law No. 12.529/2011. It is not the
purpose of this paper to describe in detail the procedures but to identify some
issues arising from this strategy.
187. See generally, Administrative Counsel for Economic Defense, ICN Anti-cartel En-




318 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 22
ings in litigation costs and reduction in fines.188 These savings are magni-
fied in a system where there are inordinate court delays. 189 On the other
hand, as we have seen, these court delays can be advantageous for the
guilty defendant and counter the otherwise powerful incentive for the
risk-averse defendant to settle.190 A firm can also avoid the publicity of a
court judgment. But, as Rubinfeld notes, the greater the reputational
benefit from a trial victory, "the less likely the case will settle." 191 Once
again this presupposes an efficient and effective judicial system.
As noted, the OECD had encouraged CADE to "make more use of its
settlement powers" and promoted the model as an effective deterrent de-
vice for cartel behavior. 192 The OECD also cautioned that effective de-
terrence is compromised if there is not a credible threat that substantial
sanctions would be imposed if the case went to trial and suggested that
settlements and "plea agreements should be used very cautiously, if at all,
early in the development of a jurisdiction's anti-cartel enforcement ef-
forts, before credible sanctions have been established and courts have
been persuaded to approve or impose high fines."1 9 3 Competition au-
thorities are encouraged to resist the "temptation to use settlements in
the first place to quickly clear an agency's docket and get rid of 'difficult'
cases, rather than to pursue the public interest in maximizing deter-
rence."1 94 In the context of lengthy court delays, Brazilian agencies may
be willing to make concessions and seek those cases which can settle ear-
lier or more easily even without a full assessment of the facts of the car-
tel.195 While this may achieve certain procedural efficiencies and
conserve valuable resources, which may be utilized for other investiga-
tions, it might equally be counter to the broader public interest.
The shift from judicial review to settlements can remove an important
level of judicial scrutiny of regulatory processes and prevent the judiciary
from having a role in the shaping of competition policy, particularly in
tempering a more technocratic regulatory focus on "economic efficiency"
with broader "constitutional" concerns and distributive outcomes.19 6 The
decline in judicial review may also miss opportunities to clarify important
substantive areas of law. 197 In addition, without a formal court decision,
it may also mean that private damages suits are discouraged.s9 8 Judicial
review is also particularly important in circumstances where regulatory
188. Rubinfeld, supra note 175, at 173; Cf Wouter Wils, The Use of Settlements in Pub-
lic Antitrust Enforcement: Objectives and Principles, 31(3) WORLD COMPETITION:
LAW & EcoNoMics REVIEW 16 (2008).
189. Id.
190. Azevedo supra note 8, at 5.
191. Rubinfeld, supra note 175, at 173.
192. Competition Law and Policy in Brazil, supra note 50, at 79; Follow-up, supra note
30, at 40.
193. Policy Roundtables: Plea Bargaining, supra note 140, at 10.
194. Id. at 43.
195. Id. at 30.
196. See generally Dubash and Morgan, supra note 10.
197. See generally Policy Roundtables: Plea Bargaining, supra note 140.
198. See discussion of private damages below.
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agencies may be subject to capture. 199
The increasing use of settlements and absence of judicial review ulti-
mately pose a significant risk to the deterrent effect ("the benign big
gun") of high fines and criminalization. 2 0 0 While the fine which is im-
posed as a result of settlement should amount to the present value of the
expected sanction in a court action (so not to put the defendant in a more
favorable position than leniency), 201 the usefulness of this benchmark is
likely to diminish as fewer court decisions are available. Predicting opti-
mal punishment for deterrence is also notoriously difficult for cartels,2 0 2
and the level of fine and discount for cooperation varies greatly.203
An institutional framework that increasingly uses negotiated settle-
ments and downplays the importance of judicial review is also perhaps in
direct opposition to the French system of administrative law adopted in
Brazil.2 0 4 Pagotto argues that this system requires authorities to act in
the face of infringement. 2 0 5 He views settlements as a "subversion of the
traditional principle of inalienability of the public interest" 2 0 6 and as an
import from a U.S. model based on different institutional settings "with-
out analysis and reflection on the peculiarities related to this
transplant." 2 0 7
Similar to the U.S. model but different from the E.U. model, leniency
in Brazil is only permitted to the firm "first-in" to the agency. The first
mover is granted full immunity from fines in return for cooperation and
disclosure. Additional firms who seek finality in the outcome and a re-
duction in fines in return for cooperation, and are unable to obtain leni-
ency, must proceed through the settlement route.20 8
199. This is particularly true in jurisdictions where competition agencies find it expedi-
ent for the purposes of "competition advocacy" and "sector-specific regulation" to
maintain a certain "mixture" of functions and a more politicized role. Neutrality
and accountability may be compromised as these agencies combine the functions
of adjudication, investigation, and policy formulation. See generally, Int'l Compe-
tition Network, Competition Advocacy in Regulated Sectors: Examples of Success
(2004).
200. Leopoldo Ubiratan Carreiro Pagotto, To What Extent Will the Possibility of Exe-
cuting Agreements with Cartel Members Impact on Brazilian Antitrust Policy? in
Competition Law and Policy in Latin America, 127, 133-134 (Eleanor M. Fox & D.
Daniel Sokol eds., Hart, 2009).
201. The 2011 law states that the fine may not be less than the minimum fine set by law
and takes into account the expected fine that could be imposed in case of convic-
tion, minus a discount for settling. See Decreto No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro
2011, DIARIO OFICIAL D)A UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 1.12.2011 (Braz.) art. 37-38.
202. See Wils, supra note 174.
203. Id.
204. Pagotto, supra note 200.
205. Id. at 121.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Similar to leniency, settlements therefore can uncover important evidence and
broaden the investigation and rate of conviction of other parties. Vinicius Marques
de Carvalho, Brazil: Administrative Council for Economic Defence, ANTITRUST
REV. OF THE AMERICAS, GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEW 93, 93 (2016).
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The settlement process introduced certain advantages over leniency, in-
cluding the ability to negotiate at any time regardless of the stage of in-
vestigation; the immediate suspension of the negotiation; the possible
inclusion by CADE of a promise to refrain from bringing further charges
against parties related to the defendant, even if they are not identified at
the time of the agreement (a so-called "umbrella" provision); and (ini-
tially) the absence of a requirement to plead guilty.20 9 The defendant
only has one opportunity to negotiate an agreement ("one-shot game"),
but CADE has a fairly broad discretion as to the content of any settle-
ment agreement.2 10 A reduction in fine can be obtained as a result of a
negotiated decision or for information or evidence against other cartel
participants. 2 1 1 An agreement can also include the application of com-
mitments such as behavioral or structural remedies (for a merger or
abuse of dominance). 2 12 While this discretion permits bespoke agree-
ments, it can also create uncertainties and risks for the defendant. Settle-
ments are encouraged when there are transparent and predictable rules,
where rewards for cooperation are clear.
In 2013 CADE amended its bylaws to encourage better guidance, in-
centives to settle, and procedures to ensure that the authority negotiating
is best placed to extract the best outcome.213 These reforms were in line
with "international best practice", particularly the E.U.'s fining and leni-
ency guidelines.2 14 Larger discounts in fines were given to encourage
parties to come forward and cooperate with additional information at the
earliest stage of investigation. 2 1 5 The previous practice of little or no co-
operation by the defendant was replaced by the requirement of "mean-
ingful cooperation". 216
209. Martinez, supra note 27, at 265; The International Bar Association (IBA) sug-
gested that CADE extend the benefit of this 'umbrella' provision to those signing
leniency agreements so as to remove disincentives to international firms. IBA,
Cartels Working Group Comments on the Public Consultation Version of the
Draft Guidelines on Leniency Published by the Administrative Council for Eco-
nomic Defense (CADE) -Brazil (2016), [4.2, http://www.ibanet.org/LPD/Anti-
trustTrade Law Section/Antitrust/WorkingGroupSubmissions.aspx; see
discussion of guilty plea below.
210. Martinez, supra note 27, at 265.
211. Id.
212. In Brazil the first applicant will receive a thirty to fifty percent discount from the
estimated fine, the second applicant, twenty-five to forty percent, the third and
other applicants up to twenty-five percent. If the approach is made after the files
are sent to the Tribunal, the possible reduction is a maximum of fifteen percent.
CADE Regulation 1/2012 art. 187-88.
213. Duarte and Dos Santos note that the fact-finding authority at the time, the Secre-
tariat of the Economic Defense of the Ministry of Justice (SDE/MJ) did not par-
ticipate in the negotiations, 'which limited the possibilities of extracting more
effective cooperation from the defendants settling'. Reforms permitted negotia-
tions to occur with the Superintendent as well as the Tribunal. Duarte & Dos
Santos, supra note 179, at 290, 294.
214. See id. at 305.
215. Id. at 293.
216. Martinez, supra note 27, at 265. CADE (TCC Guidelines), supra note 186, at 10-
17.
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Leniency programs are important tools for the detection and investiga-
tion of cartels and CADE needs to ensure that clear and separate
processes are in place for settlements and commitments so as not to un-
dermine leniency and raise any concerns regarding uncertain or discre-
tionary interventions. The OECD has cautioned that settlements could
undermine leniency if they do not maintain a clear difference between
the reward for the first to report a cartel (for outright immunity) and
those who report later for a settlement.2 1 7 Firms will be encouraged to
wait for settlements "if they lead to unreasonably generous combined dis-
counts for cooperation and settlement." 2 1 8
The European Union maintains this distinction by clearly differentiat-
ing the procedures for commitments, leniency, and settlements. Settle-
ments are only available when the investigation is concluded and the
reduction in fine is limited to 10%.219 The reduction in fine is related to
procedural efficiencies only, rather than the collection of evidence, so
that no possible disincentive or uncertainty arises for the application of
leniency or immunity agreements. 220 Commitments are also not intended
for hardcore cartels. 221
The model of 'negotiated settlements" that has emerged in Brazil dif-
fers from this E.U. approach. It is very much based on the U.S. common
law system that does not necessarily distinguish between the rewards for
cooperation and disclosure of evidence under leniency and a plea bar-
gain.2 2 2 This approach may not be appropriate in a civil law jurisdiction
where the negotiating parties may not be in a position to deal with all
aspects of liability, including criminal liability.223 In the United States,
the negotiated plea bargain is also strongly linked to the requirement for
judicial approval. Consultation and the creation of a public "Competitive
Impact Statement" is mandatory for a consent decree in the United
States, which must then be approved by the courts. 2 2 4 As Rubinfeld
notes "when resolved through a formal consent decree, settlements can
217. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Experi-
ence with Direct Settlements in Cartel Cases, at 9, DAF/COMP(2008)32, (Oct. 1,
2009), https://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/44178372.pdf [hereinafter Experi-
ence with Direct Settlements].
218. Id.; see also Duarte & Dos Santos, supra note 179, at 289-90, 293. Azevedo and
Henriksen provide an analysis of how the design of the settlement scheme can
impact on the incentive to seek leniency. Azevedo & Henriksen, supra note 180,
at 219-227.
219. Settlement in the EU is for the purpose of achieving finality in decision and reduc-
ing litigation costs rather than a broadening of the investigation. Commission No-
tice on the Conduct of Settlement Procedures in View of the Adoption of
Decisions Pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/
2003 in Cartel Cases, 2008 O.J. (C 167) 1, 5.
220. Id. at 2.
221. Council Regulation 1/2003, preamble ¶13, 2002 O.J. (L 1) 1, 3 (EC).
222. Azevedo & Henriksen, supra note 180, at 214-217.
223. See discussion below.
224. Rubinfeld, supra note 175, at 183.
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have significant precedential value." 225 Confidentiality of information
obtained in leniency and settlement agreements also raises obstacles for
the effectiveness of private enforcement.2 2 6 The appropriateness of al-
lowing the defendant in Brazil to waive a constitutional right to judicial
review for "any injury or threat to a right," 2 27 thereby excluding the
courts entirely in the context of a settlement negotiation, 22 8 is also prob-
lematic from the perspective of the institutional dynamics of an emerging
Brazilian competition law regime. In addition there are also few "public
interest" groups in Brazil ready and able to litigate as a counterpoint in
the event of regulatory capture and corruption.229
Concerns have also been raised about the manner in which the reforms
to the settlement process were proposed and implemented in Brazil.
Amendments to the 1994 law in 2007 delegated to CADE powers to es-
tablish rules for settlement agreements through bylaws and regula-
tions.2 30 The bylaws themselves and ' their future amendment have
therefore been subject to little congressional scrutiny. In this context
CADE has looked more often to adopt "international best practice" dur-
ing the reform process. 231 For example, a working group to train negotia-
tors is encouraged "to study more effective negotiating techniques based
on the best international practices" including training abroad and ex-
changing experiences with antitrust authorities from other jurisdic-
tions.232 While the adoption of these international practices can be
beneficial, they may also signal missed opportunities to develop a be-
spoke scheme that could be better adapted to the Brazilian institutional
constraints identified above.
X. THE REQUIREMENT TO ACCEPT A GUILTY PLEA
While the OECD recommended that settlements should always record
a plea of guilty, there was initially no requirement for such a plea in the
Brazilian cartel settlement scheme except in circumstances where a leni-
ency agreement was also executed.2 33 There were concerns that the ex-
225. Id.; The OECD also cautions that too much interference by courts can undermine
the effectiveness of plea agreement by introducing uncertainty into the
negotiations.
226. See discussion below.
227. Constituigio Federal [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 5 (Braz.).
228. The OECD state that on 'the one hand, it can be argued that the right of appeal
should not be treated differently than other rights that the defendant typically may
waive in plea agreements'. Policy Roundtables: Plea Bargaining, supra note 140, at
44. While the waiving of this right may increase certainty for the authority it may
also result in the negotiation of a sub-optimal penalty.
229. Pagotto, supra note 200, at 133-134.
230. CADE Resolution 1/2012 art. 204.
231. Duarte & Dos Santos, supra note 179, at 308.
232. Id. at 291. Similar calls to embrace international practice included proposals to
adopt an 'amnesty plus' scheme whereby leniency applicants are encouraged to
confess involvement in additional and separate cartel activities during investiga-
tion process.
233. Experience with Direct Settlements, supra note 217, at 8, 85-86.
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traction of a guilty plea could lead to sub-optimal penalties and thereby
potentially undermine deterrence. 2 3 4 The absence of a guilty plea, how-
ever, undermined the incentive to seek leniency over a settlement agree-
ment. 2 3 5 A guilty plea could also expose the defendant to possible
criminal liability in contrast to a leniency agreement, which protected the
"first in" defendant from both civil and criminal prosecution.2 36
In the first year of its operation, only four settlement agreements were
concluded (from sixteen applications), and three did not involve a guilty
plea because they were not concluded in conjunction with a leniency
agreement.237 SDE issued opinions in 2007 and 2008 critical of CADE's
decision to settle cartel cases without the extraction of a guilty plea, citing
the negative effect on deterrence in light of the direct evidence available
of hardcore cartel activity.2 38 In response to these concerns, CADE in
2013, introduced the requirement that a cartel settlement include the de-
fendant's "acknowledgement of participation in the investigated con-
duct." 239 But, as Martinez points out, "the provision does not refer to a
'confession' and the requirement 'to acknowledge participation' may al-
low for some flexibility with respect to its terms, compared with a strict
'confession' requirement." 2 4 0 Therefore, some ambiguity still remains re-
garding how this acknowledgment will impact criminal proceedings.
Other institutional factors in Brazil also increase this uncertainty. Un-
like the United States, where the settlement forms part of a plea bargain
with a single judicial body granting civil and criminal immunity, more
than one institution deals with these issues in Brazil.241 The absence of a
single authority imposes a risk to parties who seek settlement and in-
creases the uncertainty about criminal liability being decided else-
where.24 2 In an attempt to deal with this issue in 2016, CADE signed a
memorandum of understanding with the Federal Prosecution Service of
Sao Paulo with the intent of increasing transparency and improving coor-
dination of both the civil and criminal aspects of a TCC.2 4 3 The TCC
Guidelines state that CADE may assist any party who wishes to obtain a
plea bargain in its communication with the Public Prosecutor.244 Uncer-
234. Duarte & Dos Santos, supra note 179, at 286; International Competition Network
(ICN), Cartel Settlements, at 7 (Apr. 2008), http://www.internationalcompetition-
network.org/uploads/library/doc347.pdf.
235. Pagotto, supra note 200, at 126.
236. Decreto No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro 2011, Didrio Oficial da Uniao [D.O.U.] de
1.12.2011 (Braz.) art. 87.
237. Azevedo & Henriksen, supra note 180, at 229.
238. The decisions were made in 2007-2008. Experience with Direct Settlements, supra
note 217, 89-90.
239. CADE Resolution 1/2012 art. 185; CADE states that this requirement has been
approved by the Brazilian courts. CADE (TCC Guidelines), supra note 186, at 37.
240. Martinez, supra note 27, at 265.
241. Azevedo & Henriksen, supra note 180, at 215.
242. See Duarte & Dos Santos, supra note 179, at 3.
243. See Minist6rio da Justiga, Memorando de Entendimento No 1/2016, (15 mar.
2016), http://www.cade.gov.br/noticias/cade-e-mpf-sp-assinam-memorando-de-en
tendimentos-para-fortalecer-atuacao-no-combate-a-carteis.
244. CADE (TCC Guidelines), supra note 186, at 9.
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tainties still remain, however. The TCC Guidelines are not binding and
no absolute guarantees of immunity are raised by these negotiations.24 5
CADE's role in protection from criminal liability (in both leniency and
settlements) will also continue to pose questions of legitimacy, given ad-
ministration nature of its authority. 246
Effectiveness of enforcement as a deterrent mechanism is also largely
dependent on the perception of punishment, both by participants in the
cartel, and consumers at large. In Brazil, there is a general cultural per-
ception that participation in cartels may not be punishable conduct, 2 4 7
and this perception can reduce the incentives for a guilty plea. Fewer
guilty pleas, together with a reduced number of convictions by courts, can
exacerbate and re-enforce this public perception. Similarly the use of a
"leniency regime" may also not sit well in Brazil, where "accusations
against peers are not part of the culture (and are actually seen by some as
unethical)." 2 4 8 Competition policy, particularly the criminalization of
cartels, is often in direct opposition to a culture and industrial policy that
favors more cooperation. Historically, the Brazilian "government itself
expected industries to coordinate," including price collusion, for the pur-
poses of industrialization. 249 Brazil, like many emerging economies, has
an ambivalent political and cultural attitude towards competition as a
value, either due to the strong presence of the state or the view that ex-
cessive competition is detrimental to infant industries, wasteful of limited
resources, and imposes negative externalities on sustainability and the
environment.2 5 0
As Maurice Stucke also points out, drawing on the insights of behav-
ioral economics to examine the relationship between competition law and
intent, increased penalties and criminalization are seldom fully applied by
agencies and courts.251 Criminalization and punitive fines are often per-
ceived as unfair for cartel cases because the underlying offence can lack
specificity.252 In highly concentrated markets, for example, economists
cannot easily distinguish collusion from pro-competitive (and therefore
desirable) market behavior. 253 The alleged perpetrator's involvement
may also be unclear or he or she may not have directly benefited from the
cartel profits. 2 5 4 The economic harm to markets caused by price fixing/
245. Id. at 6.
246. Martinez, supra note 27, at 211. CADE has therefore regularly involved the Pros-
ecutor's Office in the execution of the leniency agreements. Id.
247. Azevedo & Henriksen, supra note 180, at 211.
248. Todorov & Filho, supra note 2, at 247.
249. Id. at 249.
250. DAVID J. GERBER, GLO3AL COMPETITION: LAW, MARKETS, AND GLOBALIZA-
TION, 237-241 (2010).
251. Maurice E. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, 2006 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 443, 487
(2006); see generally Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Anti-
trust in the 21st Century, 38 Loy. U. CHI. L. J. 513, 514 (2007).
252. Enterprise Act 2002, Part 6 (UK).
253. Todorov & Filho, supra note 2, at 254.
254. Maurice E. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, 2006 COLum. Bus. L. REV. 443, 455
(2006).
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cartels does not easily translate to clear legal rules and probative evi-
dence to determine moral blame.
With leniency and settlement, cooperation and detection is valued over
punishment. For the European Commission, the "interests of consumers
and citizens in ensuring that secret cartels are detected and punished out-
weigh the interest in fining those undertakings that enable the Commis-
sion to detect and prohibit such practices."25 5 As more cartel participants
obtain leniency (and settlements), the perceived pernicious nature of
these cartel offences and the appropriateness of increased penalties and
criminalization is further undermined. 256
The perception of punishment is further complicated when CADE may
take into account the existence of a "Compliance Program" 257 in a settle-
ment agreement as a mitigating circumstance for the reduction of a fine,
as evidence of the good faith of the offender. The program must be re-
lated to the subject matter of the TCC, e.g. by uncovering the infringe-
ment, and "relate directly to the decision to propose a TCC and/or
resulting from cooperation presented within the scope of the TCC."258
This approach is problematic for both immunity schemes and fine reduc-
tion because the "higher the fine reduction, the more compliance
programmes thus become a cheap insurance policy against full antitrust
liability. "259
XI. LIABILITY FOR PRIVATE DAMAGES
A guilty plea may also expose a defendant to private damage suits. 2 6 0
255. Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel
Cases, 2006 O.J. (C 298) 17, para. 3.
256. The desire not to threaten domestic leniency applications was also at the basis of
amicus briefs by the EU and other foreign agencies to the Supreme Court in F.
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v Empagran S.A., 124 S.Ct 2359 (2004), calling for a limi-
tation on foreign private suits for damages. See Brief Amicus Curiae of European
Banks in Support of Petitioners at 5, F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. V. Empagran
S.A., 124 S.Ct 2359 (2004) (No. 03-724), 2004 WL 234124; see also Brief of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland et al. in Support of Peti-
tioners at 13, F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. V. Empagran S.A., 124 S.Ct 2359 (2004)
(No. 03-724), 2004 WL 226597.
257. Cf Christine Parker & Sharon Gilad, Internal Corporate Compliance Manage-
ment System: Structure, Culture and Agency, in Explaining Compliance: Business
Responses to Regulation, 170, 174 (Christine Parker ed., 2011) (explaining that a
compliance program sets out the firm's strategy to ensure that its conduct is in
accordance with competition law, thereby minimizing the risk of a breach); An
examination of the level of local compliance with competition laws can be an indi-
cator of the extent to which global norms are "socially embedded". John Gillespie,
Localizing Global Competition Law in Vietnam: A Bottom-Up Perspective, 64
INT'L & COMP. L. Q., 935, 940 (2015).
258. CADE (TCC Guidelines), supra note 186, at 31; CADE states with respect to the
settlement procedure: "the compliance program or the commitment to its adop-
tion/ restructuring can influence the discount granted". Cf CADE, Guidelines
Competition Compliance Programs (2016), para 3.3.2.
259. Wouter Wils, Antitrust Compliance Programmes and Optimal Antitrust Enforce-
ment,1 JOURNAL OF ANTITRUST ENFORCFMENT 52, 68 (2013).
260. See Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV.
675, 698 (2010).
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In Brazil (and many other jurisdictions), members of a cartel, even if sig-
natories to a leniency or settlement agreement, are jointly and severally
liable for damages caused by anticompetitive action. 261 Private enforce-
ment, through actions for damages, can be an important supplement to
public action and an effective tool to achieve the goals of competition
law-deterrence and compensation. 262 Effectiveness depends, however,
on access to courts and a civil procedure conducive to private plaintiffs.
The level of private enforcement of competition law in most jurisdictions,
other than the United States, is still struggling to have any real impact.263
As we have seen, institutional constraints also impact the likelihood of
private damages in Brazil, as costly and difficult access to the civil justice
system and a formal and rigid system of civil procedure result in the filing
of fewer suits. 2 6 4 The relative certainty and predictability of a private
damages suit based on a "follow-on" action, where the plaintiff can rely
on a settled and final ruling by the competition agency, is also problem-
atic in a civil system where all the evidence of the administrative investi-
gation may be re-examined by the courts.265
Applicants are keen to maintain confidentiality of information dis-
closed as part of a leniency or settlement agreement in order to minimize
risk of further civil liability.266 In Brazil, information made available
throughout the course of settlement negotiations is, treated as confiden-
tial; access is restricted to the immediate parties to the proceedings and is
only disclosed when it is submitted to the CADE administrative court.2 67
A generic document containing a less detailed summary of the informa-
tion is made available to the public and disclosed to other defendants
"only for purposes of exercising their right of defense." 2 68 Additionally,
documents are returned or destroyed if an agreement is not reached.26 9
The extent of this protection in actual cases is subject to fairly broad dis-
cretion in the Brazilian system. 270 Efforts to maintain confidentially may
be futile if information is made available through parallel actions, such as
the evidence required for judicial authorisation for a dawn raid or a sepa-
rate criminal investigation.2 71 This lack of clarity can undermine cer-
261. Martinez, supra note 27, at 264.
262. See generally Crane, supra note 260.
263. Id. at 722.
264. See Duarte & Dos Santos, supra note 179, at 300; see also generally Antonio Gidi,
Class Actions in Brazil: A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 AMERICAN J. OF
Comp. L., 311, 311-408 (2003); but see Martinez, supra note 27, at 263-265 (argu-
ing the numbers of private actions and class actions are slowly increasing in
Brazil).
265. This is due to the fact that CADE's decisions "lack collateral estoppel effect."
Martinez, supra note 12, at 263.
266. See Martinez, supra note 27, at 264; see also Duarte & Dos Santos, supra note 179,
at 301.
267. Duarte & Dos Santos, supra note 179, at 296.
268. Id. at 301, 309.
269. Id. at 296-297; TCC Guidelines, supra note 186, at 10.
270. Duarte & Dos Santos, supra note 179, 296.
271. Martinez, supra note 27, at 264.
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tainty and risk exposure to further proceedings. 272
While the promise of confidentiality can strengthen the bargaining po-
sition of the government negotiator, we should also consider the impact
on private damages suits. As Rubinfeld points out, "secret settlements
are troubling; they keep valuable information from the public-informa-
tion that could inform the decisions of future litigants." 273 The authori-
ties' priorities in saving public resources and deterrence may place less
incentive to fostering private enforcement. 274
The European Commission has set out rules to prevent the disclosure
of documents obtained through leniency to claimants in private action
suits,275 but the European Courts have sought to apply different rules. In
a number of decisions, the courts have stated that the public interest in
the encouragement of leniency must be balanced against the well-estab-
lished right of individuals to bring a claim for damages and that it is up to
national courts to balance these interests on a case by case basis. 276 The
balancing of public and private interests by European Courts imposes an
important layer of constitutional scrutiny on the European Commission's
decision to withhold documents. Once again, the absence of an effective
system of judicial review in Brazil means these principles may not always
be considered by the Brazilian competition authorities.2 77
XII. APPLICATIONS BY INTERNATIONAL FIRMS
As noted, the settlement regime was slow at the beginning, and in the
first year of its operation, only four out of sixteen applications settled.278
Following the 2007 amendments to the 1994 law and bylaws, there was a
marked increase in the number of settlement agreements in cartel cases
with twenty-one executed between 2007 and 2010.279 After further re-
forms to the settlement programs in 2011 and 2013, the number of con-
cluded applications increased from six in 2013 to thirty-eight in 2014, of
which, twenty-two were cartel cases. 280 Overall, CADE has signed fifty-
four leniency agreements since the beginning of the program and has en-
tered into 100 TCCs related to cartels. 281
272. See id.
273. Rubinfeld, supra note 175, at 173.
274. See id. at 198.
275. EU, Directive 2014/104, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 No-
vember 2014 on Certain Rules Governing Actions for Damages Under National
Law for Infringements of the Competition Law Provisions of the Member States
and of the European Union, art. 6, 2014 O.J. (L 349) 13, 14.
276. See Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt, 2011 E.C.R. 1-5202; see e.g.,
Case C-536/11, Bundeswettbewerbsbehorde v Donau Chemie AG, 2013 EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS 366 (June 6, 2013).
277. See supra Parts VIII, IX.
278. Azevedo & Henriksen, supra note 180, at 228.
279. Duarte & Dos Santos, supra note 179, at 290; Azevedo, supra note 8, at 6.
280. Id. at 308; Annual Report, supra note 33, at 4.
281. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Intergovernmental Group of Experts
on Consumer Protection Law and Policy, 6 (Oct. 2016).
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The majority of leniency and settlement agreements in Brazil, particu-
larly in the early years of their operation, have been disproportionately
executed by multinational firms. 2 8 2 As Azevedo and Henriksen point
out:
Pleading guilty or committing to collateral obligations in one juris-
diction may have adverse spillovers on the prosecution of a cartel in
other jurisdictions, particularly in the case of international cartels.
That is probably why part of the demand for settlements in Brazil,
similar to the experience with leniency agreements, is from multina-
tional companies that are settling simultaneously in several
countries. 283
As we have seen, harmonized procedures can be beneficial for global
corporations who may face civil and criminal liability for conduct in mul-
tiple jurisdictions. Unharmonized regimes with divergent procedures can
pose huge risks and uncertainties to these firms, as the OECD points out:
Incentives to cooperate and to seek settlements might be under-
mined if there is no uniform approach to settlements and if a settle-
ment in one jurisdiction is perceived to increase exposure to
sanctions in continuing investigations elsewhere and/or in private fol-
low-on actions.28 4
It is not surprising, therefore, that the procedures for the use of leni-
ency and settlement regimes in Brazil have been subjected to keen scru-
tiny by the international organisations that have a particular interest in
increasing harmonization and reducing exposure for international firms.
In commenting on CADE's draft Brazilian Leniency Guidelines, the In-
ternational Bar Association (IBA) was critical of the requirement to pro-
vide a written, rather than oral, admission of the participation of the
company or individual in the conspiracy.285 This requirement, the IBA
282. The OECD notes that the SDE signed 15 leniency agreements between 2003 and
2009 and 60% of these were with parties to international cartels where leniency
agreements had been signed in other countries. Competition Law and Policy,
supra note 50, at 16. The OECD has also detailed TCC's signed in response to
international cartels e.g. cement, marine hoses, and international submarine and
underground cables cartel. Annual Report, supra note 33, at 6-7.
283. Azevedo & Henriksen, supra note 180, at 229-230 (referring, for example to the
applications for settlement of international hard-core cartels by Lafarge Brasil S/A
[Cement] and Bridgestone Corporation [Marine Hose]). Brazil noted in its submis-
sion to the OECD the growing number of members of international cartels, citing
the Vitamins and Marine Hose cases, who were applicants to the leniency program.
Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., Working Party No. 3 on Co-operation and
Enforcement, Roundtable on Cartel Jurisdiction Issues, Including the Effects Doc-
trine, DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2008)94, at 4-5 (2008). In 2013 CADE fined compa-
nies and individuals involved in price fixing in the international fuel surcharge
case. A leniency agreement was entered into by CADE with Lufthansa and Swiss
International and settlement agreements were entered into with Air France and
KLM. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., Airline Competition - Note by Bra-
zil (CADE), DAF/COMP/WD(2014)25, at 5.
284. Experience with Direct Settlements, supra note 217, at 10.
285. See IBA, supra note 209. "The confession of wrongdoing may be [presented]
orally or in writing." CADE, supra note 124, at 16.
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argued, created a disincentive to international firms:
The potential risk that leniency applicants would face in numerous
key jurisdictions could exceed the benefits that could be expected
from receiving leniency in a single country. This could create major
disincentives for potential applicants to seek leniency in Brazil,
thereby posing a risk of marginalizing Brazil's significance in interna-
tional cartel enforcement and diminishing Brazil's ability to cooper-
ate with counterparts in other developed antitrust jurisdictions.
Even more far reaching in consequence, in global cartel situations,
the absence of an effective oral leniency regime in one significant
jurisdiction (such as Brazil) could prevent a potential leniency appli-
cant from applying for leniency at all.2 8 6
In support of their argument, the IBA cites "international practice"
and notes that "the United States, Canada[,] and European Union have
adopted policies that provide for paperless leniency application." 2 8 7
Once again, the recommendations are drawn from developed jurisdic-
tions and are driven by the risk to international firms.288 They caution
that Brazil's "significance in international cartel enforcement" will be
marginalized, rather than concern for the negative impact confidentiality
may have on a fledging system of private damages and the weaker system
of judicial enforcement in Brazil.289 They also ignore, as noted above, the
judicial safeguards the E.U. courts have in place in this area.290
Many of the international settlements Brazil enters into are not the
outcome of independent investigations by Brazilian authorities. 291 They
often rely on "U.S. court convictions to open an investigation in order to
assess the effects of conduct on the Brazilian market. Evidence gathered
by E.U. and U.S. agencies has been used as a source and probable alter-
native to the insufficient number of technicians needed to cover all the
necessary investigations abroad." 292  . a
Resource constraints and information asymmetries may mean that Bra-
zilian authorities will "not [have] much opportunity to handle competi-
tion law violations occurring outside Brazilian territory, nor do they
possess the structure and know-how to do so." 29 3 International parties
may also prefer settlement over a trial because of the absence of procedu-
ral instruments in civil litigation, discovery, and cross-examination in Bra-
zil, as compared to the United States.294
286. IBA, supra note 209, at 3.
287. Id.
288. See id.
289. See id.; see also Martinez, supra note 27, at 264.
290. See supra note 276.
291. See Timm, supra note 112, at 80.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 69.
294. See generally id.; cf Gidi, supra note 264.
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XIII. CONCLUSION
Many of the recent reforms to the legal and regulatory institutions of
competition law in Brazil have closely followed the recommendations of
global experts and international agencies, such as the ICN and OECD, in
''peer reviews" and guidelines regarding "international best practice."
These recommendations have proved useful and powerful means to effect
domestic legislative and regulatory reform. To the extent that some of
these reforms may bypass other forms of governmental scrutiny, they
have posed questions regarding their democratic legitimacy. It is also
true that many of these "international best practices," especially reforms
which aim to streamline procedures for international mergers and main-
tain confidentiality for information submitted through leniency and set-
tlements, coincide more with the interests of multinational companies
and the flow of international commerce than the divergent needs of
emerging economies, potentially side-stepping more immediate political
concerns and industrial policy that may require bespoke and national so-
lutions. The move to establish autonomous, apolitical, and single-func-
tion competition institutions, in line with views of the "regulatory state,"
may similarly mean compromising goals, such as competition advocacy
and sector-specific regulation in an emerging economy, which may bene-
fit from more political intrusion and information.
The second part of this paper examined this reform process in a partic-
ular policy area in Brazilian competition law: the sharp decline in level of
judicial review and an increasing resort to extra-judicial means of settling
disputes through "settlement agreements," especially for public enforce-
ment against cartels. The shift from judicial review to settlements can
remove an important level of scrutiny of regulatory processes and pre-
vent the judiciary from having a role in shaping competition policy in
Brazil, potentially compromising certainty, transparency, accountability,
and deterrence. The increasing resort to settlements, in the context of
weak judicial enforcement, poor access to private damages suits that is
exacerbated by nondisclosure of evidence, and low risk of exposure to
criminalization, weakens the overall deterrent effect of these agreements.
The largely discretionary nature of negotiated penalties that are not sub-
ject to judicial consent, including the consideration of mitigating factors
such as compliance programs also works against other reform processes
that value transparent, autonomous, and accountable regulatory institu-
tions and the application of specific technocratic rules. Additionally, it is
true that many of these settlement and leniency agreements have been
taken advantage of by international firms who desire to minimize their
exposure to public and private enforcement in multiple jurisdictions.
While international agencies have encouraged the use of settlement
programs as a means to increase deterrence, their effectiveness as a deter-
rent device is very much dependent on the institutional framework for
enforcement. It requires the intersection of a number of finely balanced
factors that reduce uncertainty and risk for the applicant by minimizing
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exposure to criminalization, private damages, or both. The operation of
the Brazilian cartel settlement program provides a good example of how
institutional, particularly in the civil law context, and cultural factors can
demand modification, adaptation, and, even, resistance to the mere trans-
fer of an international harmonized model and, thereby, disrupt its poten-
tial benefits and outcomes.
Brazil is a BRICS economy with a long and effective history of compe-
tition law enforcement. It is important that it continues to strengthen and
improve the transparency and accountability of its settlement procedures
so that they are not just a mechanism "to quickly clear an agency's docket
and get rid of "difficult" cases." 295 Therefore, settlements must operate
alongside efforts to promote and sustain strong judicial review, including
judicial consent of settlements. In doing so, deterrence will be main-
tained and efforts towards public advocacy of competition rules are not
undermined. These objectives are challenging and difficult, but it is im-
portant that the agenda for competition reform be fully informed by na-
tional, alongside regional and global, concerns to avoid a new form of
undemocratic governance by international agencies in the absence of ef-
fective judicial review.
295. Policy Roundtables: Plea Bargaining, supra note 140, at 43.
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